The Warranty of Habitability - Part I: The Background by Jeager, Walter H. E.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 46 Issue 2 Article 1 
October 1969 
The Warranty of Habitability - Part I: The Background 
Walter H. E. Jeager 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Walter H. Jeager, The Warranty of Habitability - Part I: The Background, 46 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 123 (1969). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol46/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 




VOLUME 46 FALL, 1969 NUMBER 2
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
WALTER H. E. JAEGER*
PART I: THE BACKGROUNDt
64THE SUBJECT of implied warranties on the sale of chattels 
has per.
plexed the Common Law Courts for a long time, and has been a
source of many apparently contradictory decisions."'
This statement by the Illinois court might have been made with
equal force and accuracy today instead of, as it was, one hundred
twenty-three years ago.
Some knowledge and understanding of the origin and evolution
of the warranties that accompany the sale of goods at common law and
under the Uniform Commercial Code are essential if comprehension
and appreciation of the currently developing warranty of habitability
are to be achieved. Therefore, the evolution and development of com-
mon-law warranties will be traced and discussed in the pages which
follow. The second part of the article, to appear in the next issue, will
discuss the current trends with respect to the warranty of habitability.
* A.B. (with honors) Columbia University; M.S., LL.B., J.D., Ph.D., Georgetown
University; Diploma, Faculty of Law, University of Paris; Diploma, Ecole libre des Sci-
ences politiques (Paris); Diploma, Academy of International Law, The Hague. Member:
Bars of District of Columbia and Supreme Court of the United States.
Professor of Law, and formerly Director of Graduate Research, Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center.
Doctor Jaeger's publications include: Collective Labor Agreements (1962) ; Cases and
Materials on International Law (with William V. O'Brien 1958) ; Law of Contracts (1953) ;
Cases and Statutes on Labor Law (1939) (1959 Supp.) ; Cases on International Law (with
James Brown Scott) (1937) ; Trading Under the Laws of Great Britain (1935) ; Company
Law and Business Taxes in Great Britain (1933). He is also the author-editor of the third
edition of Williston on Contracts of which twelve volumes have been published to date.
t This article is based on an address delivered by Dr. Jaeger before the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island and the Judicial Conference of that State.
The second and final part of Doctor Jaeger's article will appear in the next issue of the
Review.
1 Misner v. Granger, 9 IM. 69, 73, 4 Gilm. 48, 51 (1847).
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The early history of warranty indicates that it has only been rec-
ognized as a form of contract action for about two hundred years, or
since the decision in Stuart v. Wilkins.' Theretofore, the action was
grounded in tort.' Prior to the case-by-case analysis of the decisions
recognizing an implied or constructive warranty accompanying the
sale of houses by a builder-vendor, it is necessary to examine some of
the leading precedents in the field of product liability4 and certain re-
lated concepts.
2 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
3 1 Williston, Sales §§ 196-257 (Rev. 1948).
4 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961); Gladiola
Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1959) rev'g 163 F. Supp. 570 (E.D.
Tex. 1958) ; Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1958); Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958); Ketterer v. Armour
& Co., 200 F. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa.
1961); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1962) ; Magee v. General Motors Corp., 117 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1953), judgment and
order vacated and cause remanded 213 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1954) ; 124 F. Supp. 606 (W.D.
Pa. 1954), aff'd per curiam, 220 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1955).
Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960);
Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955) ; Burr v. Sherwin
Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) ; Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal.
App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954) ; Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d
799 (1939); Hector Supply Co. v. Carter, 122 So. 2d 22 (Fla. App. 1960); Matthews v.
Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956) ; Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So.
2d 910 (Fla. 1953); Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
Tiffin v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959) ; Sharpe
v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E.2d 442 (1956) ; Patargias v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947) ; Welter v. Bow.
man Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943) ; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co.,
189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920) ; Cernes v. Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 183 Kan.
758, 332 P.2d 258 (1958); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Swengel
v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 14-7 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938) ; Le Blanc v. Louisville
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952) ; Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 70 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 1954) ; Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 157 Me. 10,
170 A.2d 160 (1961) ; Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) ; Biedenharn Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721, 186 So. 628 (1939) ;
Rainwater v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95 So. 444 (1923) ; Mid-
west Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959); Worley v. Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 53 S.W.2d 532 (1952) ; Seaton Ranch Co. v. Montana
Vegetable Oil & Feed Co., 123 Mont. 396, 217 P.2d 549 (1950).
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ; Greenberg v.
Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961) ; Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
13 Misc. 2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958) ; Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent
Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 4 Ohio Ops. 2d 291, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) ; Markovich v. McKesson
& Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 7 Ohio Ops. 2d 10, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 111, 149 N.E.2d 181
(1958) ; Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 330 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1958) ; Nock v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338
S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960) ; Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164
S.W.2d 828 (1942) ; Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957) ; Martin v. J. C.
Penney Co., 50 Wash. 2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957) ; Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622,
135 P. 633 (1913).
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INTRODUCTION
Originally, the common law insisted on the use of very precise
words, to wit, "warranty" or some equivalent, before a vendor could
be held. Warranties were classified as to the subject matter as:
1. Warranties of title; and
2. Warranties of quality.
As to mode of expression, warranties were further classified as
express and implied in fact; in addition, the law supplied the con-
structive warranty as a matter of public policy. It is with the latter de-
velopment that this article is primarily concerned.
Warranty of Title
While a marketable title, in the absence of an express disclaimer,
is required in the case of transfers of real property, sales of chattels at
early common law were not accompanied by an implied warranty of
title or quiet possession.5 Gradually, a development in this direction
became discernible in the law of sales. At first, it was essential that the
vendor have possession of the goods,' but later, an affirmation of title
was held effective even where the vendor was not in possession.7 How-
ever, the mere act of selling a chattel was not considered as equivalent
to a representation of title in the vendor, and therefore, a warranty,
until the second half of the nineteenth century in the case of Eichholz
v. Bannister.'
However, with the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in
forty-nine of the States, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands,
questions as to warranty of title in the sale of goods have been largely
resolved.
Warranty of Title Under the Commercial Code
Under the Code, the vendor, unless a contrary intention appears,
expressly warrants that the title conveyed shall be good :'
5 7 Williston, Contracts § 923 et seq. (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
6 Medina v. Stoughton, 1 Salk. 210, 1 Ld. Raym. 593 (1700).
7 Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789).
8 17 C.B.N.S. 708 (1864).
9 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312. Warranty of Title and Against Infringement;
Buyer's Obligation Against Infringement.
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(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a war-
ranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer right-
ful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security in-
terest or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer
at the time of contracting has no knowledge.1"
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modi-
fied only by specific language or by circumstances which give the
buyer reason to know that the person selling does not claim title in him-
self or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a
third person may have." "The warranty extends to a buyer whether
or not the seller was in possession of the goods at the time the sale or
contract to sell was made."' 2 The Uniform Commercial Code expressly
excludes "things in action" and investment securities.13 Goods are
defined to include :
1
4
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufac-
tured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the con-
tract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities and things in action. "Goods" also includes the
unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things
10 The warranty of subsection (1) is not designated as an "implied" warranty, and
hence is not subject to Section 2-316(3). Disclaimer of the warranty of title is governed in-
stead by subsection (2), which requires either specific language or the described circum-
stances. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312, Comment 6.
"Security interest" is defined in § 1-201(37).
11 This section continues:
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods
of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of
any third person by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes
specifications to the seller must hold the seller harmless against any such claim
which arises out of compliance with the specifications.
Subsection (2) [supra text] recognizes that sales by sheriffs, executors, foreclosing
lienors and persons similarly situated are so out of the ordinary commercial course that their
peculiar character is immediately apparent to the buyer and therefore no personal obligation
is imposed upon the seller who is purporting to sell only an unknown or limited right. This
subsection does not touch upon and leaves open all questions of restitution arising in such
cases, when a unique article so sold is reclaimed by a third party as the rightful owner.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312, Comment 5.
12 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312, Comment 1.
1s Uniform Commercial Code Article 8, discussed in 4 Wiliston, Contracts §§ 947-954D
(3d ed. Jaeger 1964).
14 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-105.
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed from
realty. 5
A significant illustration of the application of the principles stated
above may be found in Menzel v. List, involving the sale of a valuable
painting. 6 After a Parisian dealer had sold the work of art to a New
York picture gallery, it was bought by a private collector. 7 When the
original owner became aware that the painting was listed in a book as
belonging to the collector, she asserted her claim and asked for the
painting. When her demand was refused, this action was brought. 8
As was to be expected, the defendant impleaded the owners of the
New York art gallery who had sold the painting to him, alleging "breach
of an implied warranty of title."' 9 The trial court entered judgment for
the plaintiff, and both parties appealed.2" Implied warranties were held
to exist that:
1. The vendor had a "right to sell the goods," and
2. The "buyer shall have and enjoy quiet possession of the goods
as against any lawful claims existing at the time of the sale."1
21
The issue presented to the appellate court was: What is "or should
be the proper measure of damages for the breach of an implied war-
ranty of title (or quiet possession) in the sale of personal property."
Noting that "there is a marked absence of case law on the issue,"
the court commented: "Furthermore, the case law in other jurisdictions
in this country provides no consistent approach, much less 'rule', on this
15 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-107.
16 24 N.Y.2d 91, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
17 The earlier history of the Chagall painting showed that it had been purchased at an
auction in Brussels, Belgium by the plaintiff and her husband. During the German invasion,
the painting was removed by the invaders and its whereabouts was unknown for a period
of some 14 years. The New York buyers did not know anything about its earlier antece-
dents, but were content to rely on the reputation of the Parisian art gallery.
18 The action was brought in replevin against the private collector, List, who had paid
$4,000 for the painting.
19 During the trial, expert witnesses were called upon to testify as to the "fair market
value" of the painting which the jury found to be $22,500. The defendant List was directed
to pay this amount or return the painting; he chose the latter alternative.
20 The impleaded defendants were ordered to pay the original defendant $22,500 plus
the "costs of the Menzel action." Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 94, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 980
(1969).
21 This determination was based upon § 13 of the Uniform Sales Act, N.Y. Personal
Property Law § 94 (McKinney 1964), since superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code.
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issue and it is difficult even to add up jurisdictions to pinpoint a "ma-
jority' and a 'minority' .... In the face of such unsettled and unconvinc-
ing 'precedent', the issue is one which is open to resolution as a question
which is actually one of first impression."22
The defendants contended that the measure of damages should be
the same as that governing "breach of the warranty of quiet possession
as to real property. However," said the court,
this analogy has been severely criticized by a leading authority in these
terms: "This rule [limiting damages to the purchase price plus interest]
virtually confines the buyer to rescission and restitution, a remedy to
which the injured buyer is undoubtedly entitled if he so elects, but it is
a violation of general principles of contracts to deny him in an action on
the contract such damages as will put him in as good a position as he
would have occupied had the contract been kept."23
If the recovery of the plaintiff were limited to the purchase price
plus interest, as the court signalized,
the effect is to put him in the same position he would have occupied if
the sale had been made. Manifestly, an injured buyer is not compen-
sated when he recovers only so much as placed him in status quo ante
since such a recovery implicitly denies that he had suffered any dam-
age. 24 ... "The purpose of compensatory damages is to place the buyer
in as good condition as he would have occupied had the title been
good." This measure of damages reflects what the buyer has actually
22 As the court pointed out:
One attempt to collect and organize the law in this country on this issue con-
cludes that there are at least four distinct "rules" for measuring the damages flow-
ing from the breach of a personal property warranty of title: purchase price plus
interest; "value," without specification as to the time at which value is to be deter-
mined; value at the time of dispossession; and value at the time of the sale (An.
Interestingly enough, the annotator was able to find New York cases each of which used
language which would apparently suggest that a different one of these four "rules" was the
rule (Annot., supra at 1380) [sic]. Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 96, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982
(1969).
23 Quoting "Williston, Contracts § 1395A (3d ed. Jaeger 1968), [sic]"; emphasis added
by the court, which continued:
Clearly, List can only be put in the same position he would have occupied if the
contract had been kept by the Perls if he recovers the value of the painting at the
time when, by the judgment in the main action, he was required to surrender the
painting to Mrs. Menzel or pay her the present value of the painting. Had the war.
ranty been fulfilled, i.e., had title been as warranted by the Perls, List would still
have possession of a painting currently worth $22,500 and he could have realized
that price at an auction or private sale.
Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 97, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (1969).
24 "This rationale," the court noted, "has been applied in Massachusetts in a case con-
struing a statute identical in language to section 150 (subd. 6) of the PPL where the buyer
was held entitled to the value 'which [he] lost by not receiving a title to it as warranted
* * * His loss cannot be measured by the [price] that he paid for the machine. He is en-
titled to the benefit of his bargain' (Spillane v. Corey, 323 Mass. 673, 675, 84 N.E.2d 5
(1949) ; see also, Pilligrene v. James J. Paulman, Inc., 6 Terry 225, 226, 45 Del. 225-226, 71
A.2d 59 (1950)." Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 97, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (1969).
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
lost and it awards to him only the loss which has directly and naturally
resulted, in the ordinary course of events, from the seller's breach of
warranty.
25
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reinstated with
interest.2"
Warranties of Quality
Having examined the warranty of title, it now becomes necessary
to review the development of the warranties of quality, specifically, the
warranty of merchantability and the warranty of fitness for use or
for a particular purpose. Subsequently, attention will be concentrated
on the implied-in-law or constructive warranty which was ultimately
extended to the sale of new houses when sold by the builder-vendor.
In this development, the law has followed a path somewhat sim-
ilar to the one traced in the evolution of title or ownership warranties,
although more slowly. From cases decided at the beginning of the last
century,"' it is clear that by that time, it was no longer necessary, in
order to render the vendor liable as a warrantor, to use the word "war-
rant" or any other word of promise. This was not such a departure
from early law as it might seem, for even in the early law, when the use
of the word "warrant" seems to have been essential, the gist of the ac-
tion was regarded as the deceit caused by a misrepresentation deliber-
ately made to induce a bargain.28
How little any idea of promise was thought to be involved in a
warranty may be inferred from the early rule that there could be no
warranty as to a future event.29 In other words, a warranty must be a
misrepresentation of an existing fact in precisely the same way that a
fraudulent misrepresentation must now be in order to furnish a basis
for action.8"
It is generally if not universally accepted as the rule today that
any representation of fact as to the quality of the goods made for the
25 Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
26 11 Williston, Contracts §§ 1394 et seq.; §§ 1412 et seq. (3d ed. Jaeger 1968).
27 Power v. Barham, 4 A. & E. 473 (1836) ; Yates v. Pym, 6 Taunt 446 (1816) ; Bridge
v. Wain, 1 Stark. 504 (1816) ; Jendwine v. Slade, 2 Esp. 572 (1797).
28 Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Dougl. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
29 3 W. Blackstone's Commentaries 165 (1st U.S.A. ed. 1967).
80 12 Williston, Contracts §§ 1487 et seq. (3d ed. Jaeger 1970).
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apparent purpose of inducing the buyer to purchase them amounts to a
warranty.31
With the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code and its general,
well nigh universal adoption in the latter half of this century, there has
been a remarkable increase in consumer protection. As to warranties
of quality, the Code provides:
Implied Warranty: Merchantability82
(1) Unless excluded or modified,83 a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the prem-
ises or elsewhere is a sale.
3 4
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and
31 A certain degree of confusion was introduced by a statement which appears in Pasley
v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789): "It was rightly held . . . that an af-
firmation at the time of a sale is a warranty provided it appears on evidence to have been
so intended."
Most courts have in terms rejected any such requirement for making out an express war-
ranty.
Even in jurisdictions where the requirement of intention was laid down, intent to warrant
was not used as the equivalent of intent to contract: it means intent to affirm as a fact:
in determining whether it was so intended, a decisive test is whether the vendor
assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion
or judgment upon a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on
which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise his judg-
ment. In the former case it is a warranty, in the latter not.
De Lassalle v. Guildford (1901) 2 K.B. 215.
The Pasley statement supra has been disapproved by the House of Lords, Heilbut v.
Buckleton (1913), A.C. 30. Cf. Carleton v. Jenks, 80 F. 937, 26 C.C.A. 265, 47 U.S. App. 734
(1897) ; Rothermel v. Phillips, 292 Pa. 371, 141 A. 241 (1928) ; Spencer Heater Co. v. Ab-
bott, 91 N.J.L. 594, 104 A. 91 (1918) ; Roberts v. Applegate, 153 MI1. 210, 38 N.E. 676 (1894).
Similarly, it has been held that while intent to warrant is essential to a warranty, a
positive assertion or representation intended to induce the buyer to purchase relying thereon
raises a conclusive presumption of such an intent, Ellis v. Barkley, 160 Iowa 658, 142 N.W.
203 (1913).
82 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314.
83 See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316.
84 This provision of the Code disposes of a long moribund anachronism dating back to
an earlier era when innkeepers and tavern operators were held to "utter" the food and drink
they purveyed. A discussion of this appears in Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 A.
805 (1927) and Sofman v. Denham Food Service, Inc., 37 N.J. 304, 181 A.2d 168 (1962).
In the latter case, the majority opinion found "no resemblance between the operation of a
cafeteria and the operation of the ancient inn."
In a separate concurring opinion, it was suggested that instead of adopting the approach
the majority used, it might have been more logical and better representative of the evolution
of the law to overrule squarely Nisky v. Childs Co., supra. Since the adoption by New Jersey
of the Uniform Commercial Code, Nisky v. Childs Co. can no longer be considered author-
itative.
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(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average qual-
ity within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement,
of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and
among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on
the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified"5 other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.86
The companion warranty to that of merchantability, namely, the
warranty of fitness for use, ofttimes serves the same purpose, espe-
cially where foodstuffs or beverages are concerned." The relevant Code
section reads:
Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose"
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.8 9
Whether this warranty arises in any individual case is basically a
question of fact to be determined by the circumstances of the contract-
ing.
40
85 Uniform Commercial Code § 2.316.
86 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314. See Williston, Contracts, §§ 648-662 (3d ed. Jaeger
1961).
87 Since merchantability with respect to food means wholesome, and fitness for a par-
ticular purpose means edible or fit for human consumption, there is no significant difference
between these warranties in this context.
88 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315.
39 According to the official comment to this section, the buyer need not bring home to
the seller actual knowledge of the particular purpose for which the goods are intended or of
his reliance upon the seller's skill and judgment, if the circumstances are such that the seller
has reason to realize the purpose intended or that the reliance exists. The buyer, of course,
must actually be relying on the seller. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315, Comment 1. 8
Williston, Contracts, § 982 (3d ed. Jaeger 1964).
40 See Scanlon v. Food Crafts, Inc., 2 Conn. Cir. 3, 193 A.2d 610 (1963) ; the plaintiff
purchased a cellophane-wrapped "grinder" from a cart-vendor. The court described a
"grinder" as "a gustatory extravaganza of regal dimensions and savor." In other words, a
king-size sandwich made with elongated hard rolls.
When the plaintiff bit into the sandwich he broke an incisor tooth which cut his gums.
The pain and bleeding lasted for about an hour. The court held that "there was a breach of
implied warranty as to fitness for which the defendant is absolutely liable." The court cited
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Thus, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,41 the court emphasizes
the fact that the distinction between warranties of merchantability and
of fitness for a particular purpose are in many instances "practically
meaningless."
Disclaimer of Warranty
Especially significant in connection with the Code treatment of
warranties are the disclaimer provisions.42 No longer will any kind of
disclaimer provision be effective if consonant with public policy,4 but
as a reading of the pertinent sections will demonstrate, such disclaimer
must take a particular form:
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties"
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit waranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but sub-
ject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence 45 ne-
gation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction
is unreasonable.
46
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must men-
tion merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and
the Uniform Commercial Code, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-315. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
41 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), discussed
in Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 493 (1962).
42 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316.
43 An increasing number of decisions have held that certain disclaimer provisions
are contrary to public policy infra notes 46, 48, 49.
44 The Official Comment to § 2-316 reads in part:
Purposes:
1. This section is designed principally to deal with those frequent clauses in
sales contract which seek to exclude "all warranties, express or implied." It seeks
to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by de-
nying effect to such language when inconsistent with language of express warranty
and permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or
other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.
2. The seller is protected under this Article against false allegations of oral
warranties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence and against unauthor-
ized representations by the customary "lack of authority" clauses. This article treats
the limitation or avoidance of consequential damages as a matter of limiting rem-
edies for breach, separate from the matter of creation of liability under a war-
ranty. If no warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies
for breach of warranty.
45 Citing Uniform Commercial Code § 2-202.
46 This provision is extensively discussed in Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d
585 (8th Cir. 1964) where it was held that a contract of sale of a helicopter was governed
by the law of Pennsylvania which had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. Specifically,
there was a question as to whether a purported disclaimer of liability was effective to defeat
recovery for breach of warranty. The court held that it did not.
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to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must
be by a writing and conspicuous.
4 7
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is,"
"with all faults" or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclu-
sion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty; ...
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage
of trade.
Where a disclaimer is contrary to public policy,"8 the courts have
held that it will not be enforceable, no matter how specific and con-
spicuous its terms may be.49 The growing trend of the cases is clearly
moving in this direction," as the opinion in a leading case clearly
demonstrates:
47 It should be noted that if the warranty of merchantability is to be disclaimed,
merchantability must be specifically mentioned; where there is a disclaimer of the implied
warranty of fitness, it must be in writing and conspicuous. Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-316.
48 In addition to cases cited in text, other representative decisions include: Picker
X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1962) noted in
Breach of Implied Warranty-Absence of Contractual Privity No Defense, 12 Am. U.L Rev.
216 (1963), citing Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use, 16 Rutgers
L. Rev. 493 (1962). Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C.C.A. 1963) citing
Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra. Cf. B.F. Goodrich v. Hammond, 269
F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); the plaintiff sued for wrongful death due to defective tire
blowing out which was expressly warranted to be blow out proof. The court held plaintiff
could recover for death of driver-purchaser under express warranty and for death of a
passenger under implied warranty of fitness for purpose designed. The implied warranty
is a right arising from law, and privity is not essential where an implied warranty is im-
posed by law on basis of public policy. Judgment for plaintiff. Thompson v. Reedman, 199
F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961) citing Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 134 F. Supp.
829 (W.D. Pa. 1955). Cf. Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service, Inc, 262 A.2d 807 (D.C.
C.A. 1970) citing Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra.
49 As, for example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960), discussed in Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use, 16 Rutgers
L. Rev. 493 (1962).
50 Any number of examples could be adduced which demonstrate the application of
public policy in these product liability cases: Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F.
Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962) ; Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) ; Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Conlon v. Re-
public Aviation Corp., 204 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897 (1962) ; Hayman v. Shoemake, 203 Cal. App. 2d 140, 21
Cal. Rptr. 519 (1962) ; Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Cavanaugh, 217 Cal. App. 2d 492,
32 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1963), citing with approval Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Toscin
Sounded? 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1 (1963), noted in Keeffe, Practicing Lawyer's Guide to
Current Law Magazines, 49 A.B.A.J. 701 (1963) ; Hardman v. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc.,
48 D1L App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964) ; Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 318,
201 N.E.2d 313 (1964) ; State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc.,
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The terms of the warranty are a sad commentary upon the auto-
mobile manufacturers' marketing practices. Warranties developed in
the law in the interest of and to protect the ordinary consumer who can-
not be expected to have the knowledge or capacity or even the opportu-
nity to make adequate inspection of mechanical instrumentalities, like
automobiles and to decide for himself whether they are reasonably fit
for the designed purpose.... But the ingenuity of the Automobile Man-
ufacturers Association, by means of its standardized form, has meta-
morphosed the warranty into a device to limit the maker's liability.
51
This reasoning, which prompted the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in a unanimous decision5 2 to refuse enforcement of the disclaimer pro-
vision on grounds of public policy, was followed in General Motors
Corp. v. Dodson,"3 where a similar warranty was likewise declared in-
valid. Referring to the aforecited decisions, the Supreme Court of
Iowa said succinctly:
It is our opinion that these recent pronouncements in New Jersey and
Tennessee represent the most advanced thinking and the soundest con-
clusions in the field of new car warranties, express and implied.
54
Finally, in Norway v. Root, 5 the Supreme Court of Washington,
referring to the leading precedent, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.5' remarked that it "contains the best-documented criticism we have
found. It brands the attempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of
merchantability and of the obligations arising therefrom as so inimical
to the public good to compel an adjudication of its invalidity.
5 7
252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363
Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41
(Mo. 1963), citing Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne U.L.
Rev. 1 (1963) ; Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773
(1960); cf. Merchants Indemnity Corp. of N.Y. v. Eggleston, 68 N.J. Super. 235, 172 A.2d
206 (1961); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 80 NJ. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275
(1963) ; Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963),
citing Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1 (1963) ;
Arnie v. Laure, 16 App. Div. 2d 736, 226 N.Y.S.2d 832, af'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 737, 226 N.Y.S.
2d 1024 (1963); Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 661, 230 N.Y.S.2d 476
(1962); United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Balcrank, Inc., 175 Ohio St. 267, 25 Ohio Op. 2d
77, 193 N.E.2d 920 (1963).
51 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 375, 161 A.2d 69, 78 (1960). "To
call it an 'equivocal' agreement," the court added, "as the Minnesota Supreme Court did, is
the least that can be said in criticism of it." Citing Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp. v.
Shanus, 190 Minn. 5, 250 N.W. 713 (1933).
52 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra.
53 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960).
54 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289,
1301, 110 N.W.2d 449, 456 (1961).
55 58 Wash. 2d 96, 361 P.2d 162 (1961).
56 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), discussed
in Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use, 16 Rutgers L Rev. 493 (1962).
57 Norway v. Root, 58 Wash. 2d 96, 99, 361 P.2d 162, 164 (1961).
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The Implied Warranty and Product Liability
Practically all of the jurisdictions have made the parties who
purvey food or drink liable for injuries caused by the deleterious or
noxious character of their products. s This has resulted in the gradual
erosion of the so-called privity requirement and in many instances, it
has been frankly acknowledged that this liability is a public policy
consideration.5" There are a few jurisdictions which have adhered to
the archaic and ill-advised notion of privity of warranty, sometimes
seeking refuge in the contention that a change so drastic as its abolition
should come from the legislature. Of course, this ignores the fact that
the mischief all began with two opinions obiter dicta in Winterbottom v.
Wright where it was said that there being "[n]o privity of con-
tract[,] .. ." defendant should have judgment; also, that unless the
right to recover is confined "[t]o those who enter into the con-
tract[,] . .." there is "[n]o point at which such actions would stop." '61
What makes the paradox even more pointed, aside from the obiter
dicta, is that neither a manufacturer nor a retailer was involved in the
Winterbottom case.
This argument, however, overlooks the significant point that since
the requirement so-called was judge-made, it could also be unmade in the
same way. The courts continue to recognize this.6'
Soon after the privity requirement was first laid down," courts
began to deviate therefrom, especially after the classic decision in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." There, the court declared: "The
question to be determined is whether the defendant owed a duty of care
and vigilance to anyone but the immediate purchaser."6 And to this,
the court added:
58 Cases cited supra note 4.
59 As to public policy and its vagaries, it has been aptly said, it "[ils a very unruly
horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you." Tracey
v. Franklin (Del. Ch.) 61 A.2d 780, af'd 31 DeL Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56, 11 A.L.R.2d 990,
quoting Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229 (1824).
60 10 Mees. & W. 109, 11 LJ. Ex. 415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
61 Dicta of Abinger, C.B. and Alderson, B, respectively.
62 Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 4; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) ; Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d
33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1958).
63 Winterbottom v. Wright, supra note 60.
64 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
05 Id. at 385.
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We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and
limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out
of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation
where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.66
Thereupon, in three categories of cases, privity was simply
eliminated where negligence was the issue:
1. Products having an inherently dangerous or harmful character;
2. Defective products that were imminently dangerous; and
3. Instances where fraud or deceit was present.67
Today, goods or chattels falling within any of the afore-enumer.
ated classes almost automatically entitle the injured plaintiff to re-
covery. However, it is essential to recall that the essence of the tort
action has been negligence. Consequently, the question must be posed:
What is negligence? The courts are hopelessly at odds. 8
A number of fictions have been resorted to by the courts in order
to avoid, discard or circumvent the "privity requirement" in breach of
warranty cases.69 Among the major theories for this dispensation may
be included:
1. The agency concept;T°
2. The general offer;71
3. Direct warranty to the consumer;72
4. The distributive chain or conduit concept ;
7
66 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 64, at 390.
67 Williston, Contracts §§ 1486-1534 (3d ed. Jaeger 1970).
68 As an example of the divergent views of the courts, res ipsa loquitur and its variants
may be cited; also, the lack of harmony in the decisions where assumption of risk has
been pleaded in defense, cf. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), a±'d,
304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
69 These are discussed in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?
Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1 (1963).
70 Ryan v. Progressive Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); Mouren v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 1 N.Y.2d 884, 154 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1956).
71 Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Manufacturing Co., 61 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1932);
Carlill v. Carbolic Smokeball Co., [1893J 1 Q.B. 256.
72 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., supra note 4; Markovich v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., supra note 4.
78 Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); General
Motors Corp. v. Dodson, supra note 4.
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
5. Warranties "running with the goods";"4 and
6. The third-party beneficiary doctrine.75
Many of these are being superseded by a strict liability in tort
approach,76 or the simple elimination of privity as a matter of public
policy." An examination of a few of the leading cases will suffice to
illustrate the more significant changes that have finally led to the adop-
tion of the warranty of habitability in an increasing number of juris-
dictions.78
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
In California, at a relatively early date, a concurring opinion in
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno79 presaged the adoption of
the doctrine of strict liability. Some twenty years later, the state Su-
preme Court adopted this doctrine in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products."0 Thereafter, a number of other jurisdictions followed Cali-
fornia's example, including New Jersey and New York.8 ' As strict
liability has gained so much ground, especially as it has been espoused
by one of the most eminent writers in the field, 2 it is appropriate to
quote the concurring opinion in the Escola case at some length:
74 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., supra note 4; Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033,
274 N.W. 48 (1937) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927) ;
cf. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., supra note 4; Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (concurring opinion).
75 Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928); Manzoni v.
Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961) at 921-22; cf.
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., supra note 4; Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
supra note 62; UCC § 2-318; Williston, Contracts § 378A.
76 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962);
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
77 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) ; Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ; cf. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instru-
ment Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) citing Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has
the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. (1963); Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co,
57 Misc. 2d 45, N.Y.S.2d 94 (1967).
78 A discussion of the cases wherein it was held that there was a warranty of habitabil-
ity will be found in Part H of this article which will appear in Vol. 47, No. 1 of this Review.
79 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
80 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
81 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965);
cf. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument, 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) ; cf. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp.,
339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964), applying what was thought to be New York law.
82 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale
LJ. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
Minn. L Rev. 791 (1966).
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In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer
incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have
a defect that causes injury to human beings.... Even if there is no neg-
ligence, . . . public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wher-
ever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inher-
ent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recur-
rence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from de-
fective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of
an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming mis-
fortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury
can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business.8 3
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products never-
theless find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place
the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the manu-
facturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the
product, is responsible for its reaching the market. However intermit-
tently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may
strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one.
Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection and
the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection .... 8 4 It is
to the public interest to prevent injury to the public from any defective
goods by the imposition of civil liability generally.
8 5
In New Jersey, after the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc."8 had substantially established the breach of warranty
action as available regardless of privity, the Supreme Court went on
to adopt the doctrine of strict liability in tort in Cintrone and Santor
(footnoted herein, above). In each of these cases, the Court concluded
that as a matter of public policy, the time had come for a further ex-
tension of consumer protection. However, in Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc., 7 the Supreme Court appears to have been satisfied that the
plaintiff could proceed on theories of both breach of warranty and
strict liability in tort. This is a sound rule, especially as a distinct
83 This concept of loss distribution has also been adopted in a number of cases involving
breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, as, for example, Italia Societa per Azioni di
Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc., 376 U.S. 315 (1964) ; Reed v. The Yaka, 373
U.S. 410 (1963) ; cf. Ryan v. Pan-Atlantic Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1955).
84 This can be accomplished in a satisfactory manner by contracting for product liability
insurance as suggested in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne
U.L. Rev. 1, 137 et seq. (1963).
85 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
concurring opinion of Traynor, J., at 461, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
86 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
87 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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action of breach of warranty is emerging as a remedy without reference
to privity or other undesirable inhibitions."8
Breach of Warranty versus "Strict Liability"
In New York, it appeared as though strict liability might be the
order of the day when the Court of Appeals decided the case of Gold-
berg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,"9 where the court commented:
A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the
sales contract out of which the warranty arises, but is a tortious wrong
suable by a non-contracting party whose use of the warranted article
is within the reasonable contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer."0
Prior to this decision, the court was prepared to apply either
breach of warranty or strict liability in tort, but in the early develop-
ment of the law, as exemplified by Blessington v. McCrory Stores
Corp.,9 the concept of breach of warranty had prevailed.
In the most recent case, Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,92
the court reverted to the breach of warranty concept. In this case, a
woman, while entering the Central Trust Building in Rochester, New
York, walked through one of the entrance doors leading from the
street into the premises of the defendant, Central Trust Co., when the
door struck her causing her to fall to the ground and sustain severe per-
sonal injuries.
Four causes of action were alleged on behalf of Mrs. Mendel:
1. Negligence, seeking recovery for Mrs. Mendel's personal in-
juries, and
2. Mr. Mendel's derivative consequential damages;
3. The breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
use and damages for Mrs. Mendel; and
4. Damages for Mr. Mendel for consequential and derivative
damages.
88 As suggested by the court in Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F.
Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) where the emergence of a distinct action for breach of warranty,
as distinguished from breach of contract or tort, is recognized.
89 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
90 Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82.
91 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
92 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207 (1969).
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Upon motions to dismiss made by the defendants, the Special
Term granted these,"8 the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed 4
and the appellants, plaintiffs below, appealed.9" It is necessary to men-
tion here that the plate glass doors which were used for the entrance to
the Central Trust Building were delivered by the Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., to the defendant, in October, 1958. Thus, the question arose as to
what was the applicable Statute of Limitations with respect to appellant's
cause of action."
Had it been determined that the cause of action sought recovery
for a tortious wrong, then the action having accrued at the time of the
injury, which was October 29, 1965, a three year statute would have
governed97 and the motion to dismiss would have been improperly
granted.
Were this action, however, to be regarded as a contract cause, then
the action having accrued at the time the sale was consummated, the
action would necessarily be barred by the six-year Statute of Limita-
tions 8 (C.P.L.R. 213, subdivision 2). Since the sale was consummated
in 1958, the case was not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code
which had a four year limitation,9 the effective date of which was
September 27, 1964.0 In a four to three decision, the court rejected
the strict liability or tort theory of recovery and adhered to its earlier
decision in Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.' There the court held
that the six-year contract Statute of Limitations was applicable to an
action seeking recovery for personal injuries arising out of a breach of
implied warranty. As the court observed:
Although such a breach of duty may rest upon, or be associated
with, a tortious act, it is independent of negligence, and so such a cause
of action gets the benefit of the six-year limit of subdivision 1 of section
48 of the Civil Practice Act,' 02 as being on an implied contract obliga-
tion or liability ... while an action for breach of a statutorily implied
93 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Misc. 2d 45, 291 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1967).
94 29 A.D.2d 918, 290 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1968).
95 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Misc. 2d 45, 291 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1967).
96 Basically, the question centered upon the type of action being brought: contract or
tort?
97 N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214, subd. 5.
98 N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 213, subd. 2.
99 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725.
100 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725(4).
101 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
102 Now C.P.L.R. § 213, subd. 2.
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
warranty of fitness may involve, incidentally, some showing of negli.
gence, the contract breached is not merely one to use due care, but is a
separate (implied) contract of guaranty that the goods are fit for the
purpose for which they are sold and bought.10 3 Proof of negligence is
unnecessary for recovery in such a suit.
104
The appellate court pointed out that this rationale has been fol-
lowed since the Blessington decision, in Citizens Utilities v. American
Locomotive Co.,105 and Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co.'0 6
The principal argument upon which the appellant relied was that
the Blessington case could not apply to the instant case because of the
decision in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp. °7 which created in
favor of third party strangers to the contract a cause of action in tort
and not in warranty; therefore, "the three-year-from-the-time-of-the-
injury," rather than "the six-year-from-the-time-of-the-sale," limitations
would necessarily apply. However, the appellate court rejected this
argument. In reviewing the holding in Goldberg, the appellate court
said:108
After determining that the cause of action should exist, two ave-
nues were open to us-either to establish, as other jurisdictions already
had, a new action in tort, or to extend our concept of implied warranty
by doing away with the requirement of privity. While there is language
in the majority opinion in Goldberg approving of the phrase 'strict tort
liability,' it is clear that Goldberg stands for the proposition that not-
withstanding the absence of privity, the cause of action which exists in
favor of third-party strangers to the contract is an action for breach of
implied warranty.10 9 The instant action being one for personal injuries
arising from a breach of warranty, it is our opinion that Blessington
controls and, therefore, the applicable Statute of Limitations is six years
from the time the sale was consummated. 110
The argument was advanced by appellants that a decision in favor
of the latter would not necessarily require an overruling of the
Blessington decision for it would be possible to limit the three-year-
from-the-time-of-injury rule to those parties who are strangers to the
103 Citing Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 235 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. 471 (1918); Giminez v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934).
104 Blessington v. McCrory Stores, Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 147, 111 N.E.2d 421, 422 (1953).
105 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 N.E.2d 171 (1962).
106 11 A.D.2d 796, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1960), motion for leave to appeal denied, 8
N.Y.2d 711, 170 N.E.2d 834 (1960).
107 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
10s Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207 (1969).
109 Emphasis supplied.
110 Citing C.P.LR. § 213, subd. 2.
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contract. However, the court pointed out that this would create the
anomalous situation of possibly giving greater rights to the stranger
than to the immediate purchaser."1 ' The Court offered as an illustration
that the driver and purchaser, and the passenger, might both be per-
sonally injured in an automobile accident caused by a manufacturing
defect. If the Statute of Limitations had already run on the warranty
action, then the purchaser would be relegated to a possible action in
negligence whereas the passenger could still sue and recover by merely
showing the defect and the resulting injury, based on the concept of
strict liability."'
A further argument was that in order to eliminate the possibility
of such an anomaly, the Blessington decision could simply be overruled;
as thus, the three-year limitation from time of injury for all personal
injury actions should become effective. However, this also was rejected
as the court said that this could not be done for the legislature, by adopt-
ing the applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code had
already "clearly manifested an intention to the contrary.""'  The court
then quoted pertinent provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code:...
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be com-
menced within four years after the cause of action has accrued....
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless
of the agreed parties lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of
warranty occurs when tender deliveries made, except that where war-
ranties explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and the re-
covery of the breach must await the time of such performance, the cause
of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered."
6
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach in.
clude
(b) Injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty.116
While the court recognized that the Code did not apply to the
111 This suggestion was criticized in the dissenting opinion which insisted that "strict
liability is based in tort and not in contract," citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A,
comment m (1964); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
112 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207 (1969).
113 As noted above, the Uniform Commercial Code did not take effect in New York
until September 27, 1964.
114 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725(1) and (2).
115 Emphasis supplied by the court.
116 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-715(2) (b).
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instant case, nevertheless it considered itself precluded from establish-
ing, other than for a limited duration, a three-year limitations period
from the time of the injury for all personal injury actions.
The court also noted in passing that the extension of warranty
protection to plaintiffs not in privity of contract is no longer merely a
product of case law, for the New York State Legislature in adopting
the Uniform Commercial Code to some extent at least also disregarded
the absence of privity; the Code provision reads:
Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied.
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any nat-
ural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section.
117
Here, the court engaged upon a further discussion of what the
parties had agreed to, namely, that strict liability in tort and implied
warranty in the absence of privity are merely "different ways of de-
scribing the very same cause of action." The court added:
If we were to adopt a three-year limitations period from the time
of the injury, then we would create a situation where at least those
plaintiffs not in privity covered by section 2-318 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, would be entitled to pick and choose between the code's
four-year-from-the-time-of-the-sale, and our three-year-from-the-time-of-
the-injury, limitations period, depending upon which, under the facts
of a given case, would grant them the longest period of time to sue.118
Basically, the court suggested that even if the case presented
merely an open policy question (which it did not consider to be a fact)
the court declared, "We would nevertheless affirm."
We are willing to sacrifice a small percentage of meritorious
claims that might arise after the statutory period has run in order to
prevent the many unfounded suits that would be brought and sustained
against manufacturers ad infinitum. Surely an injury resulting from
a defective product many years after it has been manufactured, pre-
sumptively at least, is due to operation and maintenance. It is our
opinion that to guard against the unfounded actions that would be
brought many years after the product is manufactured, we must make
that presumption conclusive by holding the contract Statute of Limita-
117 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318.
118 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E2d 207 (1969).
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tions applicable to the instant action and limit appellants to their action
in negilgence. 119
A decidedly vigorous dissenting opinion was registered in which
three of the judges concurred. 2 ' The dissent summarized the issues in
the case:
1. Does a cause of action of so-called strict liability for an un-
reasonably dangerous condition in a defective product sound in contract
for breach of warranty or in tort?
2. Does the applicable statute of limitations run from the sale
and delivery of the defective product or from the date of the injury
to the plaintiff?
It was further pointed out that in the case of a tort, no cause of
action arises until the injury occurs."'
Tracing the history of strict liability, the dissent found that the
scope of liability for personal injuries and property damage occurred
first in negligence and more recently in strict product liability and has
developed beyond the parties in contractual privity but without an
accompanying development in analysis or terminology beyond that of
warranty, third party beneficiaries and privity. In consequence, con-
tract and tort law have been confused. Thus, there arises the paradox
that there can be no strict liability without "warranty" and strict liabil-
ity is to be determined to some extent by "warranty" law, that is, con-
tract law.
1 22
Citing Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick," the dissent pointed
out that the tort Statute of Limitations was applied by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey and the cause of action accrued from the date of
injury.124 "Only last May [1969]," the dissent added, "the Supreme
119 Id. at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210. Thus, the court departed from its holding in Goldberg
v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963), citing Jaeger, Privity
of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1 (1963), to the extent that it
adhered to breach of warranty rather than strict liability in tort although both had been
mentioned as possible remedies in the Goldberg case.
120 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207 (1969).
121 Citing Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824
(1936) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, comment c, at 525.
122 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207 (1969) (dis-
senting opinion).
123 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
124 This required a departure from Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960), discussed in Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness, 16
Rutgers L Rev. 493 (1962).
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Court of Illinois applying tort principles to the exclusion of contract
warranty analysis to a strict product liability case, held that the tort
Statute of Limitations controlled and ran only from the time of the
injury (Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co.' 25) ." 12 However, since a petition
for rehearing has been granted in the Williams case, there may be some
question as to its continuing validity.
The dissenting opinion, while recognizing that up to the time of
the decision in Blessington v. McCrory Corp.2 ' the New York courts
had consistently held that the breach of warranty was a contractual
matter, and, therefore, the period of limitations would be computed
from the time of the sale,12 pointed out that in Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp.,129 the Court of Appeals said "unequivocally":
A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the
sales contract out of which the warranty arises, but is a tortious wrong
suable by a non-contracting party whose use of the warranted article is
within the contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer 30
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the existence of a
cause of action in contract or breach of warranty does not diminish or
preclude any other remedy which an injured person may have against
the manufacturer-supplier resulting from acts constituting a breach of
the contractual warranty obligation.1"' Neither the majority nor dissent-
ing opinions seem to recognize that a new, distinct and entirely separate
form of action is emerging-namely, breach of warranty.
18 2
125 No. 41425 filed May 28, 1969, rev'g and remanding 93 Ill. App. 2d 344, 236 N.E.2d
125 (1968), rehearing granted. Cf. Little v. Maxam, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
126 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 350, 253 N.E.2d 207, 213
(1969) (dissenting opinion).
127 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
128 However, if the time of sale is taken as the point of computation of the statute and
runs for six years after the breach of warranty, there could be no recovery since the
doors were purchased in 1958, whereas the injury occurred in 1965. Thus, the victim's
right of action terminated in 1964, the year before the action was filed.
Consequently the plaintiff was left without any remedy since there could be no re-
covery, according to the court, on the basis of strict liability in tort, which would have
treated the time for bringing the action as a period within three years from the date of
the actual injury, which would have been within a period from 1965 to 1968.
129 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
130 Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82.
131 The dissenting opinion cites Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897 (1962) as well as Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960) ; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J.
5 (1965) ; Lascher, Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 38 So. Cal. L. Rev. 30 (1965).
132 Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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Farm Animals, Feed and Warranties
The sale of farm animals has frequently resulted in litigation.
In Miller v. Penney,18 a case which has gained classic proportions, a
bull of pedigreed ancestry and championship caliber was sold to sire
a prospective pure-bred herd. However, he completely disappointed his
new owner, not to mention the cows, and an action was brought to
recover the price as well as the cost of care and maintenance of the
high order to which this champion had become accustomed.184 In the
words of the court:
Eileenmere 627th was born in the stable of luxury and raised in
the field of plenty. With a long line of champions as his ancestors, he
was destined from the day he was calved to follow in the hoofsteps of
his illustrious progenitors. In this respect, at least, he did not disappoint
his "fitters" (a term applied to those who prepare bulls for the show
ring). Before he was two years old he had traversed the "circuit," ap-
pearing in twelve shows. Eleven times he was acclaimed as Grand
Champion and the twelfth time as champion of his class. This is no
mean record where competition in glamour and other bullish qualities,
obscure to the uninitiated, is so pronounced as it is in the world of
show bulls. Finally having won his laurels as a great star in the show
ring, he attracted by his reputation the "big money" buyers. After this
was accomplished, he, like most others of his kind, was removed from
the tinselled surroundings of the show world and returned to his home
that he might bring to the enjoyment of his owners the fruits of his
success.
135
133 77 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
134 Miller v. Penney, 77 F. Supp. 887, 888 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
This is adequately demonstrated by the following excerpt from the court's opinion:
He was touted as the great son of a noble sire and heralded far and wide as the
outstanding "Star of the Year" and the new Junior Sire of an equally aristocratic
herd of Aberdeen-Angus cows and heifers. But, alas, while his meretricious charms
made him a champion in the show ring, they were unavailing in the mating pen. The
cruel hand of fate had destined the great Eileenmere 627th, 735647, to be a celibate.
Never could he become the proud Junior Sire of so noble a herd, with ambitious vi-
sions no doubt of becoming, in time a prouder Senior Sire; never would he know
the proud chest-expanding pride of seeing his own flesh and blood walk the green
pastures among a herd over which he would majestically preside. There would be no
Eileenmere 628th. Because of defective hind quarters and genital defects he was
physically unable to perform the mating act which nature intended should result in
reproduction. He was worthless for the purpose for which he was purchased.
Id. at 887-8; cf. Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. App. 1960).
s5 Introducing the issues, the court remarked:
This is a bull case, and I sincerely regret that I agreed to decide it rather than have
it tried before a jury composed of stockmen and farmers who through experience
would have been more familiar with the commercial "Love of Life" of a "blooded"
bull than I.
While my youth was spent in rather close association with bulls, they were not
the kind involved here. They were common plebian bulls which at this time of the
year roamed the woods and fields and walked the fence rows, challenging with low
growling moans or shrill bellows every animate or inanimate object. They were
bulls which pawed the dirt and rolled their heads in impassioned frenzied wrath that
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Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The United States Dis-
trict Court continued in this jocular vein and held that there was a
breach of warranty since the bull was totally unfit for breeding pur-
poses.1"6
The trend towards increased consumer protection is highlighted by
a remarkably lucid opinion in a case where the plaintiffs were breeders
of cattle who had purchased feed which had noxious qualities and
damaged the herd. In Kassab v. Central Soya,'37 the trial court found
that the feed which had been purchased did not "meet the requirements
of merchantability."'8 8 Thereupon, the defendant-manufacturer de-
fended on the ground of lack of privity.'
After reviewing the case-law in various jurisdictions which have
discarded privity, 4 ' and discussing one of its earlier decisions,141 the
Pennsylvania court cogently observed:
Courts142 and scholars alike' 43 have recognized that the typical con-
knew no bounds and respected no normal enclosure. But Eileenmere 627th, 735647, is
an aristocrat of the kine world, a product of this age of high prices.
Miller v. Penney, 77 F. Supp. 887, 888 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
136 In addition to Miller v. Penney, 77 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Mo. 1948), there have
been any number of similar cases involving warranties of animals; among these may be
cited: Ver Steegh v. Flaugh, 251 Iowa 1011, 103 N.W.2d 718 (1960), boar for breeding;
Vander Eyk v. Bones, 77 S.D. 345, 91 N.W.2d 897 (1958), Battle Pioneer, a bull, failed to
breed; however, as notice of breach was not given within a reasonable time, the buyer could
not rescind; Grovedale Feed Co. v. Corron, 155 N.E.2d 291 (Mun. Ct. Ohio 1957), chickens
were sick, held that warranty was breached; Lyle v. W.H. Hodges & Co., 82 So. 2d 457
(La. App. 1955), bull calf died three days after purchase, warranty held breached.
137 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
138 Id. at 226, 246 A.2d at 852. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314.
139 Relying on Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 382, 221 A.2d 320 (1966) ; Hochgertel v. Canada
Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
140 The court reviews and discusses the leading precedents including: State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Anderson-Weber, 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449
(1961) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ; Jacob E.
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
141 Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
142 Citing Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966);
Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. App. 1962) ; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961) ; Chandler v. Anchor
Serum Co., 198 Kan. 571, 426 P.2d 82 (1967) ; Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp.,
372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963) ; Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965) ;
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ; Randy Knitwear,
Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962) ; General Motors Corp.
v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Grimes, 408 S.W.2d
313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). Cf. Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.W.2d 859
(1931); Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967)
(applying Va. Law). Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Olive, 234 So.2d 910 (Miss. 1970).
143 Here, the court suggests:
See, e.g., Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne L Rev.
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sumer does not deal at arms length with the party whose product he
buys. Rather, he buys from a retail merchant who is usually little more
than an economic conduit. It is not the merchant who has defectively
manufactured the product. Nor is it usually the merchant who adver-
tises the product on such a large scale as to attract consumers. We have
in our society literally scores of large, financially responsible manu-
facturers who place their wares in the stream of commerce not only
with the realization, but with the avowed purpose, that these goods
will find their way into the hands of the consumer. Only the consumer
will use these products; and only the consumer will be injured by them
should they prove defective.'
44
Somehow, in spite of an overly optimistic opinion to the contrary
by a federal appellate court in Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co.,145 Pennsyl-
vania law has continued to permit manufacturers to escape contractual
liability for harm caused consumers by defective merchandise simply
because the manufacturer technically did not sell directly to the con-
sumer. There was no privity of contract between them. No one denied
the existence of absolute liability under the code for breach of implied
warranty. But this warranty ran not to the injured party, but rather to
the middleman who merely sold to the injured party, thus ignoring com-
mercial reality and encouraging multiplicity of litigation. 4" However,
1 (1963) ; Jaeger, How Strict is the Manufacturer's Liability?: Recent Developments,
48 Marq. L. Rev. 293 (1965) ; Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault
and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 Texas L. Rev. 855 (1963) ; Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L.R. 791 (1966) ; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960) ; Speidel, The Virginia
"Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 51 Va. L. Rev. 804 (1965) ; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363 (1965)....
Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 227 & n.4, 246 A.2d 848, 853 & n.4.
144 Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 227-28, 246 A.2d 848, 853 (1968).
"Consumer" as here used is not restricted only to the "Purchaser" of the defective
product, but also extends under section 2-318 of the U.C.C. to others who in fact use
the defective goods and whose persons or property is injured thereby. The exact
limits of the class of such other persons (not the purchaser) who may sue a remote
manufacturer in assumpsit, or for that matter anyone in the distributive chain,
without a showing of privity involves the question of so-called "horizontal" privity,
an issue not before us in the present case. See Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409
Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
Id. at 228 & n.5, 246 A.2d at 853 & n.5. Cf. Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422
F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1970).
145 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
146 We realize that prior to the adoption of section 402a of the Restatement of
Torts by this Court, see Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), a rather
compelling argument against discarding privity in assumpsit actions for breach of
warranty existed. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, once a breach of warranty
has been shown, the defendant's liability, assuming of course the presence of proxi-
mate cause and damages, is absolute. Lack of negligence on the seller's part is no
defense. Therefore, prior to the adoption of section 402a, it could be said that to
dispense with privity would be to allow recovery in contract without proof of
negligence, while requiring a showing of negligence in order to recover for the
same wrong against the same defendant if suit were brought in tort. To permit the
result of a lawsuit to depend solely on the caption atop plaintiff's complaint is not
now, and has never been, a sound resolution of identical controversies.
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there appears to be an inclination to limit the protection of privity as
is indicated by the following excerpt from Kassab v. Central Soya:
Thus, in the present case, for example, appellants' complaint alleg-
ing that their property (cattle) was damaged (rendered valueless as
breeding stock) by virtue of the physical harm caused when these ani-
mals ate appellee-Soya's defective feed would have been sufficient to
state a valid cause of action had it been captioned "Complaint in Tres-
pass." However, because appellants elected to style their complaint as
one in assumpsit for breach of warranty under the code, the require-
ment of privity would prevent these identical allegations from making
out a good cause of action.147 This dichotomy of result is precisely the
same evil which, prior to the Restatement, prevented the abolition of
privity. It now compels this abolition.
The majority opinion in Miller148 candidly admits that the policy
considerations underlying the imposition of strict liability in tort are
precisely the same as those which dictate the abolition of privity in con-
tract actions for breach of warranty. 149 Yet, the Court in Miller never-
theless retreated from the modern view because of a belief that section
2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code requires privity in suits against
a remote manufacturer. 150 We no longer adhere to such a belief for we
are convinced that, on this issue, the code must be coextensive with Re-
statement section 402a in the case of product liability.' 51
However, with Pennsylvania's adoption of Restatement 402a, the same demands
of legal symmetry which once supported privity now destroy it. Under the Restate-
ment, if an action be commenced in tort by a purchaser of a defective product
against a remote manufacturer, recovery may be had without a showing of negli-
gence, and without a showing of privity, for any damage inflicted upon the person
or property of the plaintiff as a result of this defective product. The language of
the Restatement is both clear and emphatic: (quoting Rest. Torts § 402a).
Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 229, 246 A.2d 848, 853-54 (1968).
147 In consequence of this outworn and archaic adherence to form rather than giving
due heed to substance and consumer protection, some jurisdictions have gone over to the
concept of strict liability, as, for example, California, which has adopted the principles stated
in Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A infra note 259.
148 Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
149 The opinion in Miller v. Preitz, Id. at 392-93, 221 A.2d at 325 declares:
It must be emphasized that all we have said with regard to the requirement of
"privity of contract" and the requirement of a family relationship applies only to
actions in assumpsit for breach of implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial
Code. The "privity" requirement has long been abandoned in Pennsylvania in
actions in trespass for negligently caused injuries. See Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 28-30, 68 A.2d 517, 530-532 (1949). Furthermore, we recog-
nize the social policy considerations behind imposing strict liability in tort upon
all those who make or market any kind of defective product, notwithstanding an
absence of negligence on their part. A similar result would follow from abandoning
the requirement of 'privity of contract' in warranty actions. (Emphasis supplied).
150 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318 reads:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it
is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. (Emphasis as sup-
plied in Miller v. Preitz, supra)
151 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 (1964), cited by the court, is quoted inIra
note 259. In this connection, it might be pointed out that contract cases from other
jurisdictions dispensing with privity have allowed recovery for three types of injury; "eco-
nomic loss," State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110
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The explanation offered by the Court in Miller for not abolishing
'vertical' privity of contract in breach of warranty actions brought un-
der the UCC was that section 2.318 of the code, limiting the persons
benefited by an express or implied warranty to the buyer himself, to
members of the buyer's family or household, and to guests in his home,
impliedly prohibited any further relaxation of privity strictures. How-
ever, although the code sets an absolute limit on those injured parties
who may seek shelter under the umbrella of a manufacturer's warranty,
section 2-318 says nothing whatsoever about the second problem that
confronted the Court in Miller'52 and is before us again today. That is:
how far back up the distributive chain may an injured party go in seek-
ing to enforce an implied warranty? 15 3 Must he be satisfied with recov-
ery only against his immediate seller, or may he also hold liable the
manufacturer with whom he had no personal contact? 154 In short, given
the code's pronouncement on "horizontal privity"'155 (who, besides the
N.W.2d 449 (1961) ; injury to plaintiff's property other than the defective article itself,
Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Co., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963) citing with approval Jaeger,
Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1 (1963) ; and personal
injury, Heningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), discussed
in Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness, 16 Rutgers L Rev. 493 (1962).
152 Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
153 Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575, crit. in Jaeger, Privilty
of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1 (1963) ; the court refers to
the "distributive chain." Finding, that the plaintiff was not within the chain, and was not in
privity, he was denied recovery although he had been injured when a bottle of Canada Dry
exploded. Not a very satisfactory decision.
154 This question is answered in the second concurring and dissenting (in part)
opinion in Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320, 338-39 (1966).
In my view, the arguments for extending the full protection of strict liability to
consumers in non-food cases, widely accepted by other jurisdictions, as well as by
legal commentators, are compelling, just as those same arguments were compelling
in food cases. The public interest in affording the maximum protection possible
under the law to human life, health and safety; the inability of the consumer to
protect himself; the seller's implied assurance of the safety of a product on the open
market; the superior ability of the manufacturer or seller to distribute the risk of
loss; the needless circuity of recovery and the expensive, time consuming, wasteful
and often unjust process which insistence upon privity frequently occasions-all
support the extension of the protection of strict liability beyond the food cases to
those involving other consumer goods as well.
See, e.g., Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesne
L. Rev. 1 (1963) ; Jaeger, How Strict is the Manufacturer's Liability? Recent De-
velopments, 48 Marq. L. Rev. 293 (1965); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability
Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 Texas L. Rev. 855 (1963);
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale
L.J. 1099 (1960) ; Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Lia-
bility Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 Va. L. Rev. 804 (1965); Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L.
Rev. 363 (1965); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5
(1965) ... [Most footnotes have been omitted.]
Id. at 419 & n.6, 221 A.2d at 338 & n.6.
155 Our decision today has no impact on "horizontal privity," our holding being
confined solely to the issue of whether a purchaser, a member of his family or house-
hold, or a guest in his house, may sue the remote manufacturer of a defective
product for breach of warranty. Our decision therefore leaves undisturbed Hochgertel
or any other Pennsylvania decision involving the extent of the class of product
users entitled to the protection of a seller's or manufacturer's warranty.
Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 232 n.8, 246 A.2d 848, 855 n.8.
I believe that the time has arrived for this Court to settle the long perplexing
problem of strict liability in cases involving defective products causing personal in-
juries by discarding privity as a predicate to the maintenance of such actions.
[Citations omitted.]
Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 422, 221 A.2d 320, 340.
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urchaser, has a right of action against the manufacturer or seller of a
efective product), what, if anything, does this signify concerning the
code's complete silence on the issue of "vertical privity" (who, besides
the immediate seller, is liable to the consumer for injuries caused by
the defective product) ?
The Uniform Commercial Code answers this question.'56 It is clear
that its draftsmen did not fix any limits as to the elimination-or re-
tention-of privity.'57 Nor was it intended that changes would be
restricted to the action of legislative bodies. 58 The court answered this
contention:
Curiously, the imagined limits on the Court's power under the code
to discard vertical privity have not prevented us from eliminating the
privity requirement in cases involving tainted food. 159 We now believe
at the time has come to recognize that the same policy reasons under-
lying the food cases also underly cases involving defective non-edibles
which cause injury. When it is considered that continued adherence to
the requirements of vertical privity results merely in perpetuating a
needless chain of actions whereby each buyer must seek redress for
breach of warranty from his own immediate seller until the actual man-
ufacturer is eventually reached, and in memorializing the unwarranted
notion that a change in the caption of a complaint can completely alter
the result of a lawsuit, our course becomes well marked. Vertical privity
can no longer commend itself to this Court. 160
As the lower court had held that there had been no breach of
warranty by the dealer, it had refused to hear any evidence as to the
damages occasioned by the deleterious cattle feed. Accordingly, the
judgment of the trial court was vacated, and the record remanded. This
case is a clear and logical illustration of the manner in which courts
have been discarding the so-called privity requirement.
156 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318 quoted supra note 150.
157 Any development beyond the limits suggested in § 2-318 was left to the individual
jurisdictions; thus, problems of vertical privity were simply not covered.
158 That all changes in the law were to come only from the legislature was suggested
by the court in Henry v. John W. Eshelman & Sons, 99 R.I. 518, 209 A.2d 46 (1965) ; but cf.
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
Of course, it is well understood that a legislature, such as, for example, in Virginia
and Georgia, may abolish privity, Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269
F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967) applying Va. law; Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute:
Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 Va. L. Rev. 804 (1965).
159 Citing Caskie v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953) ; Hoch-
gertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), crit. in Jaeger, Privity of
Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1 (1963).
160 Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 234, 246 A.2d 848, 854-56 (1968). Cf. Wyatt
Industries, Inc. v. Publicker Industries, Inc., 420 F.2d (5th Cir. 1969), as to disclaimer
under the UCC § 2-316 as adopted in Pennsylvania.
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Breach of Warranty and the Notice Requirement
In a case of novel impression, L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 6 '
certain tomato seeds had been bought by a commercial grower from a
seed store. The plants that grew from the seeds were inferior and not
of the quality represented on the package. Thereupon, plaintiff grower
brought this action for breach of warranty against the immediate vendor
and the remote distributor. The trial court entered judgment for the
plaintiff and the distributor appealed. Said the appellate court:
A cause of action exists, based upon a breach of warranty, where
one sells seed to an immediate purchaser upon a misrepresentation of
a certain variety and fitness, and the purchaser, who relied upon the
warranty, is entitled to recover damages from the seller for the breach
of warranty. And the same is true where inferior plants are sold and the
purchaser relies upon a warranty of fitness.162
The appellant argued that the plaintiff appellee's cause of action,
if any, was against the vendor of the tomato plants and not the appellant
since the latter had sold nothing to plaintiff. A further contention was
that it had made no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the
tomato plants purchased by appellee and that its warranty, with respect
to the seed, did not extend to and reach appellee, a remote purchaser,
because appellee was a purchaser of the tomato plant and not the seed
which was distributed by the appellant.
However, since there was a statute 8' which abolished the defense
of lack of privity in actions for breach of warranty, "express or im-
plied," the court concluded: "We think appellant's argument is without
merit." However, the appellant raised the further defense of lack of
notice as required by the Uniform Commercial Code."8 4 As there was
no allegation of notice in the complaint, the court said:
We must agree with the appellant that the appellee's complaint is
subject to a demurrer since it does not contain an allegation of notice.
161 438 S.W.2d 717 (Ark. 1969).
162 Citing Earle v. Boyer, 172 Ark. 535, 289 S.W. 490 (1927); Smeltzer v. Tippin,
109 Ark. 275, 160 S.W. 221 (1913).
163 That statute reads:
The lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any
action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for
breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff
did not purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom
the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be
affected by the goods.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-318.1 (Supp. 1967).
164 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-607(3) (a).
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The issue of allegation of notice, under this section, seems to be
one of first impression in our state. However, it appears that in juris-
dictions which have had occasion to interpret this section, the giving
of notice must be pleaded as a condition precedent to recovery. . . [A]
majority of the American Courts which have considered the problem
have held the notice requirement applicable in a case of the nature now
before this court and that such notice should be alleged in the complaint
as a condition precedent to recovery.165
Are Warranties Limited to Contracts of Sale?
A somewhat general and rather unfortunate misconception exists
that warranties are limited to sales. 66 Illustrative of this fallacious
supposition is a case of novel impression in which an employee of a
chemical manufacturing company met his death allegedly as a result
of the inhalation of vanadium dust in the course of his employment. 7
The trial court dismissed the counts of breach of express and implied
warranties and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant
on the negligence count. Appellant alleged error on the part of the lower
court in dismissing the warranty counts."68
Since the action was based on diversity of citizenship, and the
main contention of appellant was breach of implied warranty, the court
examined the state law to determine liability:
We must, therefore, determine the extent of the development in
New Jersey of the doctrine of strict liability which has grown out of
165 L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 438 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ark. 1969), quoting Smith
v. Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 122 So. 2d 591 (1960) and citing:
Maxwell Co. v. Southern Oregon Gas Corp., 158 Or. 168, 74 P.2d 594, 75 P.2d 9, 114
A.L.R. 697 (1937); Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769 (1951);
Sweetheart Baby Needs v. Texilon Co., 8 Misc. 2d 921, 166 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1957);
Hellenbrand v. Bower, 16 Wis. 2d 264, 114 N.W.2d 418, 115 N.W.2d 533 (1962);
Nekuda v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 175 Neb. 396, 121 N.W.2d 819 (1963) ; Salecki
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Hartford, 20 Conn. Supp. 143, 127 A.2d 497 (1956);
Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Affiliated Gas Equipment, 191 Cal. App. 2d 313, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1961); Faucette v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 196, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 215 (1963).
166 If proof were needed to show that this is not so, all that is required is to refer
to the cases dealing with the warranty of workmanlike service common to stevedoring
contracts, or the warranty of seaworthiness, the breach of which has occasioned so much
litigation, treated hereinafter.
167 La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
168 As to the express warranty count, the appellate court found that the defendant
company had simply promised to perform its services in
a workmanlike manner and to construct a plant suitable for its intended purpose.
The promises as to performance, therefore, are limited to "good and workmanlike"
execution and this indicates only the exercise of due care or the absence of negli-
gence. It does not support an interpretation which would absolutely require safe
performance under whatever circumstances might arise. On the claim of express
warranty arising from the contract between Scientific Design and Witco there is,
therefore, no basis for liability without proof of negligence (Emphasis supplied).
Id. at 940.
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the expanded principle of implied warranty in products liability cases
and its applicability to the facts in this case. Our judgment necessarily
must be speculative for there is no New Jersey decision expressly ruling
a case such as this, which does not present the usual situation of a prod-
uct mass produced for consumer use but instead involves professional
engineering, design and construction services performed under contract
for a large manufacturer.
New Jersey stands in the forefront of those states which have
abandoned the need to stand in privity of contract and eliminated any
requirement of proof of negligence in cases where a consumer has
suffered injury in the use of a mass produced acticle .... 169
In this developing field of the law, courts have necessarily been
proceeding step by step in their search for a stable principle which can
stand on its own base as a permanent part of the substantive law ...
As we indicated in Henningsen,170 the great mass of the purchasing
public has neither adequate knowledge nor sufficient opportunity to de-
termine if articles bought or used are defective. Obviously they must
rely upon the skill, care and reputation of the maker. . . . It must
be said, therefore, that when the manufacturer presents his goods to the
public for sale he accompanies them with a representation that they are
suitable and safe for the intended use. . . . The obligation of the manu-
facturer thus becomes what in justice it ought to be-an enterprise
liability, and one which should not depend on the intricacies of the law
of sales.1
71
Although the doctrine of strict tort liability of a manufacturer with-
out proof of negligence has thus been recognized in New Jersey, it still
bears the imprint of its origin in contractual warranty. . . .
189 The New Jersey Supreme Court led the way in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960), which held that
the wife of the purchaser of a defective automobile was entitled to recover damages
for personal injury from the dealer and the manufacturer although there was no
showing of negligence and there was no privity of contract, and despite attempted
limitations on the express warranties contained in the contract of sale.
Id.
170 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), discussed
in Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 493
(1962).
In Henningsen, the principle on which liability was made to rest was that an
implied warranty existed which ran in favor of the wife of the purchaser of the
automobile since she must have been within the anticipation of the parties when
the automobile was sold to her husband.
Id.
171 Quoting Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), quot-
ing 8 Williston, Contracts third (Jaeger) edition: emphasis supplied. There seems to be no
need to be concerned about the "intricacies of the law of sales," since warranties are not
limited to sales; cf. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., supra note 4.
The federal court cites and discusses a number of the leading New Jersey prece-
dents including: Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., supra. New Jersey formerly recog-
nized the concept as embodied in the Uniform Sales Act, NJSA 46:30-21, and has since
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, which codifies the doctrine of implied warranty in
sales of goods, NJSA 12A:2-314, 315. Cf. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633
(1913).
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In all the cases decided by the New Jersey courts there existed a
defect in the product which caused the injury to the ultimate consumer.
Even when described as strict liability in tort the underlying principle
has been analogized to the sale of goods. 172 . . . Indeed, it has been
suggested that whatever the label given to the modern rule, the analogy
to sales cases should form the limit of liability.
173
This conclusion seems open to question. There are situations where
there has been no sale, yet a warranty has been implied. Perhaps the
best example is furnished by the many cases where a warranty of work-
manlike service is imposed on builders, repairmen, and stevedores, for
example.
However, in the case of the shipowner, the liability for breach of
the warranty of seaworthiness is absolute, as distinguished from the
liability of the manufacturer which is described as "strict."'
174
A situation which has needed corrective action for some time is
presented by the dismissal of actions where injury or death results from
transfusion of blood, whether contaminated or of an improper or un-
assimilable type.175 In a number of cases, this has been described
172 For example, in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965),
an infant child was permitted to recover from the builder of mass produced homes for
injuries caused by a defective heating system in a home which her parents had leased
from the purchaser.
Following this, in Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968), the court
overthrew the long-established "completed and accepted" rule in New Jersey under which
one not a party to a contract was barred from suing the contractor or architect for negli-
gence in building houses, once the structure was accepted by the owners.
While it is true, as the court suggests, that the "New Jersey Supreme Court has
recognized that the element of mass production is important in determining whether to
attach strict liability to construction work," Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra, that
court also recognized the breach of an implied in law, or better stated, a constructive
warranty in the Schipper case and has gone on from there, Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospi-
tal, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1967).
173 Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1965), a beauty
parlor was held chargeable for injury to plaintiff's scalp as a result of a permanent wave
in which a lotion manufactured by another was used. The court held that the issue of breach
of implied warranty should have been submitted to the jury in addition to the issue of
negligence which the jury had decided in favor of the defendant.
The trial court had refused to submit the implied warranty issue to the jury on
the ground that the application of a permanent wave by the beauty parlor amounted to
the rendition of a service rather than the sale of a product and that no implied warranty of
reasonable fitness existed.
This holding by the trial court is reminiscent of the early view the common law
took of the service of food and drink in taverns and inns now corrected by the Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-314(1) which makes the serving of food and drink "a sale." A similar
anachronism exists in regard to blood transfusions.
174 Leading cases on the doctrine of "strict liability" as it has gradually evolved are
discussed infra.
175 The leading exponent of this restrictive and unfortunate type of holding is Perl-
mutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
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as a "service," as though that should make any difference in the end
result-recovery for the injured patient, or if killed by the deadly blood,
then for the surviving next of kin.'76
Whether "service" or "sale," there is no adequate or logical rea-
son why a warranty implied in law, or imposed by law, in short, a
constructive warranty that the blood is wholesome and fit for its intended
purpose should not exist.1"
In light of all the confusion that has surrounded this artificial
and much-to-be deplored "distinction" between serving and selling
blood, a decision in Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital7 by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey (which is leading the way in consumer protection)
has reassuring overtones.
When a patient was hospitalized and operated on, it was deter-
mined that blood transfusions were essential. After the fifth transfusion,
hepatitis resulted, and this action was brought for breach of the implied
However, it appears that the rationale imposing warranty upon retail druggists filling
prescriptions that the drug prescribed has been compounded, that due and proper care in
filling prescription has been used, and that the drug has not been infected with some adul-
terating foreign substances should be applied to processors of blood which is to be used
by purchasers for transfusions into human beings, Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla.
1967). Cf. Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank Inc., infra note 176.
170 The following may be deemed representative of this outworn concept:
Furnishing of blood for transfusion by a hospital to a patient is incidental to service
provided by hospital in course of treatment, and is not a "sales transaction" covered by an
implied warranty under the Code or otherwise, Lovett v. Emory University, Inc., 116 Ga.
App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
A patient who contracts disease from transfusion of impure human blood purchased from
nonprofit public service corporation may not recover damages in breach of implied warranty
of fitness, where presence of the disease in the blood was not ascertainable, and patient's
physician was as fully aware of such facts as seller, Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War
Memorial Blood Bank Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); the court described
the transfusion as involving acts common to legal concepts of both a sale and a service,
though more in the nature of a service.
Cf. White v. Sarasota County Public Hospital Board, 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1968).
177 Indeed, if there is to be a warranty of workmanlike service in the case of repairs
or stevedoring service, there is an even more cogent reason for imposing one where blood is
being transfused-the patient's life may be at stake.
178 Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 52 NJ. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969), action in damages
against hospital and blood banks for injuries resulting from hepatitis following blood
transfusion. Judgment of lower court granting partial summary judgment was unanimously
reversed.
Cf. Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967), where it
was held that a complaint which alleged, inter alia, that blood hank sold certain blood to
plaintiff which was impure and unfit for use intended as it contained certain virus commonly
know as serum hepatitis, and that an implied warranty arose between the blood bank, as
seller, and plaintiff, as buyer, of the blood, stated a cause of action.
Complaint seeking recovery for death of blood donee who died from homologous serum
hepatitis allegedly contracted from blood received by transfusion on ground that commercial
blood bank had breached implied warranty that blood was fit for human use stated cause
of action against the blood bank. Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1967).
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose intended, as
well as negligence. 7 Defendants' motions for summary judgment were
partially granted,' and this appeal followed.
The court found the issue to be
whether a commercial blood bank and a hospital may be held account-
able on the basis of implied warranty or strict liability where their
furnishing of blood containing viral hepatitis has resulted in consequen-
tial injury to the complaining party. The issue is a very important one
involving highly significant policy considerations and obviously should
not be decided on the wholly inadequate record before us.'
81
Quoting the Supreme Court of the United States:8 2
A maximum of caution is necessary in the type of litigation that we
have here, where a ruling is sought that would reach far beyond the
particular case.l ss
The case was remanded for a more comprehensive and careful
examination.
Is Recovery Available for Property Damage?
Although for many years, lack of privity was a complete defense
in actions not involving personal injury, within the past decade, a re-
179 The lower court held that the transfer of blood which hospital had purchased
from blood bank for $18 per container and for which hospital charged patient, who
contracted hepatitis as result of blood transfusions, $25 per container involved a "sale"
within Uniform Commercial Code, Sec. 2-106 defining sale as the passage of title from
seller to buyer for a price and referring to the sale of goods, Jackson v. Muhlenberg
Hospital, 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967). Cf. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hospital, 114 Ill. App. 2d 294, 251 N.E.2d 773 (1969).
180 This was based on the court's finding that there was no implied representation
by blood bank nor by hospital which procured blood from blood bank and used it in
transfusions that it was free of virus of homologous serum hepatitis, in view of lack of
any test known to science for determining whether human blood contained that virus.
'8' Citing, inter alia, Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla.
1967) ; 2 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability, 349, et seq.
182 Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
183 The court noted that:
Despite the meagre nature of the evidence before it, the trial court entertained
the motions, made findings, and granted partial summary judgments ....
And concluded:
We are satisfied that it should now be vacated and that the entire matter should
proceed to trial. To that end the partial summary judgments are set aside and the
plaintiffs' claims on their alternative theories against all of the parties including
the Essex County Blood Bank are reinstated. At the trial, a complete record should
be made, including not only detailed testimony as to the nature of the defendants'
operations, but also expert testimony as to the availability of any tests to ascertain
the presence of viral hepatitis in blood, the respective incidences of hepatitis in blood
received from commercial blood banks and other sources, and such other available
testimony and materials as may be relevant to any of the questions presented by
the parties, including such economic and other factors as may bear on the ques-
tion of whether the doctrine of implied warranty or strict liability should apply to
deliveries and transfusions of blood. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 53 NJ. 138,
142, 249 A.2d 65, 67-8 (1969).
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assuring tendency has been noted to grant recovery where the defective
goods have caused property damage. Among the leading cases may be
noted Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply,"4 Randy
Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co. 5' and Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc.'
Textile materials were deficient in the last two cases, and recovery
was granted regardless of privity. In the first, now a classic, cinder
blocks used in building a home were found to be "bleeding" and
crumbled. Breaking with tradition and precedent, the Supreme Court
of Michigan in a sharply divided opinion granted recovery to the
homeowner.8 7
After running through the entire gamut of variations, exceptions,
the fate of privity in the negligence cases as exemplified by Mac-
Pherson'"5 and its interposition in breach of warranty cases, the Mich-
igan court concluded that it might be well simply to eliminate the so-
called "general rule" entirely in line with the suggestion of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Carter v. Yardley :..
The long opinion in the Yardley Case concludes very simply: The
time has come for us to recognize that the asserted general rule no
longer exists. In principle it was unsound. It tended to produce unjust
results. It has been abandoned by the great weight of authority else-
where. We now abandon it in this Commonwealth.
To these sentiments we utter a fervent amen.1 90
In Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,' decided
by the New York Court of Appeals, there appears to be a further de-
parture from the doctrine of privity. The plaintiff had entered into a
number of contracts for the purchase of certain textile material. When
some of this material did not conform to written representations regard-
ing its qualities, breach of warranty was relied on in an action against
184 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
185 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
186 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
187 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958).
188 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1015 (1916).
189 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946), described by the court as "a leading modem
case in this field."
190 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 135, 90 N.W.2d
873, 881 (1958).
19' 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
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the manufacturer. Lack of privity was, of course, the defense intro.
duced by the defendant who had produced the resins with which the
textile material had been treated to prevent the very shrinkage which
had nevertheless occurred.
The court was asked by the plaintiff to extend the rationale of
Greenberg v. Lorenz..2 to an action for breach of an express warranty
by a remote purchaser against a manufacturer who induced the pur-
chase by representing the quality of the goods in public and on labels
which accompanied the goods. The court found that privity should be
dispensed with here, particularly in the context of the modern world
of merchandising in which the manufacturer launches a direct appeal
to the ultimate consumer through the use of mass media advertising
and "sanguine" representations on packages and labels. 9
The rationale underlying the decisions rejecting the privity require-
ment is easily understood in the light of present-day commercial prac-
tices. It may once have been true that the warranty which really induced
the sale was normally an actual term of the contract of sale. Today,
however, the significant warranty, the one which effectively induces the
purchase, is frequently that given by the manufacturer through mass
advertising and labeling to ultimate business users or to consumers with
whom he has no direct contractual relationship.
Although strongly urged by the defendant not to impose strict li-
ability since there had been no personal injury from the defective goods
delivered, the court nevertheless imposed strict liability on the defen-
dant.
In the Santor case, the purchaser of defective carpeting was held,
entitled to recover from the manufacturer, although not in privity; the
192 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
193 On this point, the court noted:
The world of merchandising is, in brief, no longer a world of direct contract;
it is, rather, a world of advertising and, when representations expressed and dissem-
inated in the mass communications media and on labels (attached to the goods
themselves) prove false and the user or consumer is damaged by reason of his reli-
ance on those representations, it is difficult to justify the manufacturer's denial of
liability on the sole ground of the absence of technical privity. Manufacturers make
extensive use of newspapers, periodicals and other media to call attention, in glow-
ing terms, to the qualities and virtues of their products, and this advertising is di-
rected at the ultimate consumer or at some manufacturer or supplier who is not in
privity with them. Equally sanguine representations on packages and labels fre-
quently accompanying the article throughout its journey to the ultimate consumer
and, as intended, are relied upon by remote purchasers. Under these circumstances,
it is highly unrealistic to limit a purchaser's protection to warranties made directly
to him by his immediate seller. The protection he really needs is against the manu-
facturer whose published representations caused him to make the purchase.
Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 12-13, 181 N.E.2d 399, 402 (1962).
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Supreme Court of New Jersey remarked, "the basis of liability turns
not upon the character of the product [i.e., whether, if defective, it is
likely to cause personal injury] but upon the representation, there is no
justification for a distinction on the basis of the type of injury suffered
or the type of article or goods involved."' 94
Should the "Innocent Bystander" Recover?
At least three jurisdictions have answered this question affirma-
tively. California, in Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,"9 5 Michigan,
in Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 9 ' and New Jersey in Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service.9 In each of these cases, by
the application of the strict liability doctrine, it was held that if the
manufacturer placed a defective product on the market, such as an auto-
mobile,19 or a shotgun,'99 or a truck, 00 he would be liable to a by-
stander who was injured thereby.
In a recent case, Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co.,"0' decided
last year, a plumbing contractor was killed when a stepladder on
which he was standing was knocked over by an aluminum extension
ladder on which another workman was standing. The aluminum ladder,
which had been purchased from defendant, slipped away from the wall
against which it was standing and struck the step ladder. In holding
for the widow of the deceased plumbing contractor, the court reviewed
the applicable law in California, stating: "A manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is
to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being."20"
Although defendant contended that the doctrine was not available
to an injured innocent bystander, the court found that this had been
194 Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
195 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84 (1969).
196 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
197 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
198 Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84 (1969), noted 72
West Va. 200 (1970).
199 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
200 Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2.d 129 (1965).
201 274 A.C.A. 369, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969).
202 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900
(1962).
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answered by Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,... "a major decision in
the development of the law of strict liability in this state. ' 204 In the
Elmore case, the court held that strict liability would extend to an
injured bystander who brought an action against the manufacturer and
retailer of "an allegedly defective automobile.
' 2°5
The mere fact that the injury was caused by a ladder and not by
an automobile did not prevent the application of the doctrine of strict
liability, especially since "loss distribution" has been adopted by Cali-
fornia as "the rationale for imposition of strict liability on manufac-
turers and retailers."20 6 As the court phrased it in Elmore:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection
than the consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the defect
is reasonably foreseeable.
207
Under the strict liability tort theory, where notions of privity have
no part, the bystander could probably recover if injury to him was fore-
seeable under generally applicable tests.208
In cases where the law imposes a duty, the question of foreseeabil.
ity of injury is an issue for the jury.20 9 In the instant case, the jury
found that the defective design of the ladder was the proximate cause
of death. The court held that the defect in the article "as well as prox-
imate cause" may be established by circumstantial evidence.210 Judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff was affirmed.
In an action for injuries sustained by a bystander from a bolt
picked up by a rotary lawn mower and hurled at him, defendant man-
ufacturer moved to dismiss the complaint. 21' The motion was denied
203 Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84 (1969), noted 72
West Va. 200 (1970).
204 Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 A.C.A. 369, 371, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194, 197
(1969).
205 Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84 (1969), noted 72
West Va. 200 (1970).
206 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
207 Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657, 451 P.2d at 89.
208 Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 A.C.A. 369, 372, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194, 198
(1969), quoting Harper & James, Torts, Supplement to Volume II, p. 246.
209 Citing Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 164 (1964);
Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 62-63, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) ; Wright v. Arcade School Dist.,
230 Cal. App. 2d 272, 277, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1964).
210 Citing Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84 (1969),
noted 72 West Va. 200 (1970).
211 Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969) ; cf. Matthews v.
Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1953).
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after the court reviewed the leading cases.21 2 Since diversity of citizen-
ship was the basis for federal jurisdiction in this case, state law was
applicable.21 Theories upon which the plaintiff rested his claim were:




In disposing of the motion to dismiss, the court adopted an ad-
mirably straightforward and realistic approach; as suggested in an
earlier case, 21 "the difference between implied warranty as it has been
developed in products liability law and strict liability as defined in the
Restatement is more semantic than real. ' 217 Under both theories, the
conditions of liability are a "defective condition," which exists when
the product leaves the seller's control, and which proximately causes
the plaintiff's injury. "While this court is unwilling to hold that there is
never a significant difference between the two theories, it is plain that
212 Cases cited or quoted include: Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th
Cir. 1967), decided under Oklahoma law; Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427
(N.D. Ind. 1965); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185
(1966).
213 Under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188,
(1938), this court is committed to the law of Indiana in this diversity action. Rea-
sonable foreseeability is the fundamental test of proximate cause, and this rule is
not changed by the fact of an alleged intervening act or agency. Elder v. Fisher, 247
Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); New York Central R.R. Co. v. Cavinder, Ind.
App., 211 N.E.2d 502 (1965); Phares v. Carr, 122 Ind. App. 597, 106 N.E.2d 242
(1952) ; Buddenberg v. Morgan, 110 Ind. App. 609, 38 NE.2d 287 (1941) ; McIn-
tosh v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 111 Ind. App. 550, 38 N.E.2d 263 (1941). Unless rea-
sonable minds could not differ, the determination is one for the trier of the facts.
Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966) ; Phares v. Carr, 122 Ind. App.
597, 106 N.E.2d 242 (1952). It cannot be said as a matter of law that defendant's
conduct was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged injuries.
Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 778 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
214 Supra notes 4, 48, 50, 140, 142, 151.
215 As defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1964).
216 In Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965), a de-
fective transmission, although the gear shift was placed in "park," permitted a parked car
to roll down a slope and kill plaintiff's decedent as he was playing golf. The court, applying
strict liability under § 402A, refused to dismiss the complaint against the manufacturer of
the automobile and suggested that foreseeability and reasonable anticipation of injury from
a defect were the proper tests. It was recognized that the likelihood of injury from the use
of a defective automobile existed not only for the driver or passenger, but for pedestrians
as well:
The public policy which protects the user and the consumer should also protect
the innocent bystander.
Id. at 150, 214 A.2d at 699, cited in Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service, Inc., supra note
48, as "26 Cum. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965)."
217 The court observes, "Compare Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960)." Id. at 146, 214 A.2d at 696.
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the outcome of the vast majority of cases is not affected by this fine
legal distinction. .. .
Grounds for dismissal of the action advanced by the defendant
may be enumerated:
1. Plaintiff was a mere bystander who may not recover because
he is not in privity with the defendant;
2. The alleged injuries arose from the use of the product rather
than from a defect in the product which existed when it passed from the
defendant's hands;
3. The hazards, if any, were sufficiently obvious that plaintiff
incurred the risk;
4. That the product was not defective; and
5. No warning was required because the hazards, if any, were
sufficiently obvious to the plaintiff.
This being a case of novel impression, there being no local prec-
edents to guide the federal court, it concluded that it would have to
look "to all available data and adopt the rule which it believes" the
state supreme court would choose. That court "would unquestionably
adopt the best reasoned and most intrinsically fair position, and pre-
sumably a determination by this court on such a basis would find
approval.... "219
The court explored a number of theories under which a bystander
might recover where he was injured by a defectively made product:
1. A seller or manufacturer owes a duty to those who, according
to reasonable foreseeability, will be affected by his product if defec-
tively manufactured or designed; or
218 Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 779 (1969), citing Greeno v. Clark
Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 430 (N.D. Ind. 1965). Nor does the plaintiff care.
219 Citing Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
In this connection, a rather unfortunate, and to say the least, astonishing decision, Green
v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), flatly rejected the suggestion that
under an appropriate statute of Florida, the Supreme Court of that state be asked for an
advisory opinion as to the local law. It would appear that the majority en banc was appre-
hensive that the answer from the Supreme Court of Florida would be far from consonant with
its own un-Erie minded decision. The refusal of the majority to seek the advisory opinion
of the state court cannot be supported.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
2. Strict liability should be imposed in favor of all persons re-
gardless of foreseeability.
The court, however, need not choose between these theories because
under either defendant in this case owed a duty to the plaintiff. Plaintiff
is within the "any person" test. As to the foreseeability test, this
court holds that a person standing approximately 150 feet from a lawn
mower utilizing rotary blades is foreseeably within the zone of danger
that exists if the product is defective in design or manufacture.
To hold otherwise would be to exalt form over substance. There
is nothing inherent in the status of bystander that requires the denial
of the right to sue the manufacturer in strict liability ...
Referring to a leading precedent,22 the court observed:
Would anyone, having read the court's exhaustive opinion, expect a
result reasoned differently had, say, the plaintiff been a pedestrian who,
when the Henningsen car "veered sharply to the right and crashed into
a highway sign and a brick wall," suffered crushed legs as the car struck
the wall?
Or, taking another example, "and assume that the plaintiff there
had been a bystander or visitor injured by a crumbling and buckling
of some wall of the cottage. Would our result have been different?"'22 '
The court concluded that a different result in either of the cases
adduced would not have been warranted whether the injured party had
been a pedestrian, bystander or visitor. This is certainly logical, and
consistent with the public policy of greater protection against defec-
tively produced goods. It may even bring about that much to be desired
result-more careful scrutiny and better quality control by the manu-
facturer.
ILLINOIS CASE LAW
Just five years ago, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Suvada v.
White Motor Co.,222 delivered a definitive opinion in which it firmly
declared that lack of privity would be no defense where a defective
product caused injury.'
220 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
221 Citing Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958), and quoting Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
(1965).
Cl. Keener v. Dayton Electric Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1970), rehearing denied,
adopting the doctrine of strict liability in an action for the death of a third party who was
electrocuted when attempting to lift a sump pump which had no ground wire.
222 32 11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Cl. Little v. Maxem, Inc., 310 F. Supp. (S.D.
Ill. 1970), quoting Suvada v. White Motor Co., supra at 623.
223 Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); the
Supreme Court of Iowa, after reviewing a number of the leading cases, including Escola v.
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In this case, the plaintiffs had purchased a reconditioned tractor
unit from the defendant company in which the brake system failed. The
tractor collided with a bus causing personal injuries and substantial
property damage. Thereupon the plaintiffs, owners of the tractor unit,
filed this action against the truck manufacturer and the brake supplier
(Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Company) to recover
costs incurred in the settlement of personal injury claims and repair of
the bus and their tractor-trailer unit.
The trial court held for the plaintiffs as to the damages to the trac-
tor-trailer unit, but denied recovery as to personal injury claims, dam-
age to the bus and related expenses. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the
Court of Appeals held for the plaintiffs as to all elements of damage
pleaded against White and Bendix on the basis of breach of an implied
warranty.224 This appeal was perfected by Bendix. Defenses advanced
by Bendix included:
1. That any warranty as to its product ran to White; since there
was no privity between plaintiffs and Bendix there could be no re-
covery;
2. Therefore, any liability of Bendix to plaintiffs must be pred-
icated on negligence, and if both Bendix and plaintiffs were negligent,
they would be joint tortfeasors and no contribution could be obtained
from Bendix.
After tracing the gradual erosion or final obliteration of privity
from its original enunciation in Winterbottom v. Wright225 to the pres-
ent, the court signalized such outstanding precedents as Thomas v. Win-
chester22 and Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co.227 which adopted
the three recognized exceptions to the so-called privity rule:
1. Where the negligence of a manufacturer or vendor is with
reference to an article imminently dangerous to human life or health;
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), quoted Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965), to the effect that "public policy is the primary factor for imposing strict
liability on the seller and manufacturer ......
224 8 Williston, Contracts §§ 982 et seq. (3d ed. Jaeger 1964).
225 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
226 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
227 171 111. App. 355 (1912).
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2. Where an owner's negligence causes injury to one invited on
the premises, and
3. Where one knowing the qualities of an article dangerous to
health or life sells the article without giving notice of these qualities.
By 1934, the Supreme Court of Illinois had recognized and
adopted the reasoning of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.22 8 which held
that "any article negligently manufactured, which is reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril, is a thing of danger." '229 The court added:
We agree with the reasoning of the Massachusetts court in Carter
v. Yardley & Co. where it observed:230 "The MacPherson case caused
the exception to swallow the asserted general rule of nonliability, leaving
nothing upon which that rule could operate. Wherever that case is ac-
cepted, that rule in truth is abolished, and ceases to be part of the
law. '231 Implicit in Lindroth v. Walgreen Co. was the view that the
general rule, rather than the exception to a so-called "general rule," is
that a manufacturer may be liable for injuries to a person not in privity
with him and that such liability is governed by the same principles gov-
erning any action for negligence. 23 2 That defendant understood this to
be the rule is shown in its reply brief when it stated "Where negligence
is the basis of the action, let us not permit talk of privity, for it is
neither necessary, nor proper." We now make explicit that which was
implicit in Lindroth, lack of privity is not a defense in a tort action
against the manufacturer.
233
The court then declared that in addition to the manufacturer, liability
would extend to the following:
1. The seller;..
2. A contractor ;285
3. A supplier;..
4. One who holds himself out to be the manufacturer ;217
228 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
229 Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 I. 507, 514, 193 N.E. 529, 532 (1934), approving
and adopting the reasoning of the Court in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
230 319 Mass. 92, 103, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946).
231 407 Ill. 121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950).
232 Citing Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) ; cf. Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk, 18 111. 2d 226, 163 N.E.2d 425 (1959).
233 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 fl1. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
234 Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 407 Ill. 121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950).
235 Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 111. 2d 28, 139 N.E.2d 275 (1956).
236 Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk, 18 IlL 2d 226, 163 N.E.2d 425 (1959).
237 LUll v. Murphy Door Bed Co., 290 IlL App. 328 (1937).
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5. The assembler of parts;2"8 and
6. The manufacturer of a component part.289
The court next considered the nature of the manufacturer's liability
and found that the earliest cases applying the doctrine of liability were
those where unwholesome food was sold ;240 this was based on considera-
tions of public policy as, it might be added, is the constructive warranty
in general:
Where, however, articles of foods are purchased from a retail
dealer for immediate consumption, the consequences resulting from the
purchase of an unsound article may be so serious and may prove so
disastrous to the health and life of the consumer that public safety de-
mands that there should be an implied warranty on the part of the
vendor that the article sold is sound and fit for the use for which it
was purchased. 24
1
While the Illinois courts have held that an action for breach of war-
ranty is an action ex contractu and can only be maintained by a party
to the contract,242 the supreme court has stated that privity of contract
is not essential in an action for breach of implied, that is, constructive
warranty in the sale of food.243 In Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co.244 and
Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,245 other Illinois courts sanctioned
actions for breach of warranty in food or beverage cases by parties not
in privity with the vendor or manufacturer on the ground that the im-
plied warranty of the manufacturer or vendor "runs with the sale of
the article."24
The Supreme Court of Illinois has forthrightly declared its com-
plete agreement with the unequivocal statement of the high court of
Texas in Decker & Sons v. Capps:24'
Here the liability of the manufacturer and vendor [of food] is
imposed by operation of law as a matter of public policy for the pro-
28 Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934).
239 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
240 Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. 468 (N.Y. 1815).
241 Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 IlM. 93, 99, 49 N.E. 210, 211 (1897).
242 Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28, 139 N.E.2d 275 (1956).
243 Tiffin v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959).
244 318 111. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943).
245 332 MI1. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947).
245 Citing Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L Rev. 119, 153-155 (1957).
247 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
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tection of the public, and is not dependent on any provision of the con-
tract, either expressed or implied.2 4s
The Illinois court summarized the reasons that had been advanced
to support the imposition of strict liability in food cases:
1. The public interest in human life and health requires all the
protection the law can give against the sale of unwholesome or noxious
food or beverages;249
2. Manufacturers solicit and invite the use of their products by
advertising in various media, especially television, representing to the
public that these products are safe and suitable for use; in consequence,
the law imposes liability for any damage these products cause;25 and
3. Losses caused by unwholesome food or beverages should be
borne by those who have created the risk and reap the profit by placing
the product in the stream of commerce.251
At this point, the Court added:
Without extended discussion, it seems obvious that public interest
in human life and health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase
the product and the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the
risk and reaping the profit are present and as compelling in cases in-
volving motor vehicles and other products, where the defective condi-
tion makes them unreasonably dangerous to the user, as they are in
food cases.
The recent and oft-cited cases of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.,252 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.2 53 and Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corporation254 typify the increasing number of
decisions which are extending the concept of strict liability to the man-
ufacturers of products whose defective condition makes them unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer.255
Following a review of various arguments directed towards the use
of the "strict liability" concept, including quotations from various au-
thorities, 256 the court pointed out that the Supreme Court of New Jersey
248 Id. at 617, 164 S.W.2d at 831-32; see Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210
(1897).
249 Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897).
250 Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 1M. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947).
251 Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897).
252 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
253 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
254 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
255 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 III. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
256 Including Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.AJ. 446 (1964); James,
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in its Henningsen decision had imposed strict liability on the theory of
implied warranty. In California, the supreme court in Greenman had
arrived at the same result using the theory of strict liability in tort.
Finally, in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instruments Corporation, the Court
of Appeals of New York predicated liability upon the theory of implied
warranty, although suggesting that "strict tort liability" might be a
more accurate characterization.
However, as pointed out above, in a case decided early this year,
Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,25 the New York court reverted
to its position that the action for damages based upon personal injuries
"arising from a breach of warranty" was essentially one sounding in
contract and that therefore, the applicable Statute of Limitations "is
six years from the time the sale was consummated," and the action was
time-barred.25
The court then noted that the cases wherein liability was based
upon strict liability in tort could be grounded on the provisions of Sec-
tion 402A of the Revised Restatement of the Law of Torts as approved
in May 1964 by the American Law Institute,"' as was done in Goldberg
v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.
Holding that the defendants were strictly liable in tort, the court
found it unnecessary to decide what effect Section 2-318 of the Uni-
Products Liability, 44 Tex. L Rev. 44 (1955) ; Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale
U. 1099 (1960).
257 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207 (1969).
258 Citing C.P.L.R. § 213, subd. 2.
259 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1964) reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for phys-
ical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Of this section, the Illinois court said:
The rapid development of the law on this subject is typified by the development of
section 402A. The original Restatement of Torts had no provision for strict liability.
In April 1961, Tentative Draft No. 6 recommended adoption of a new section, sec-
tion 402A, which recognized a seller's strict liability for food for human consump-
tion. In April 1962, Tentative Draft No. 7 expanded the coverage of the section to
products intended for intimate bodily use. Tentative Draft No. 10 applies to all
products and expanded coverage to property damages as well as bodily harm. Su-
vada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 622, 210 N.E.2d 182, 187 (1965).
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form Commercial Code would have upon an action for breach of im-
plied warranty.260 Pointing out that heretofore a showing of negligence
was necessary to discard privity,26' the court declared that currently
"negligence is no longer necessary."26
To the argument that abolition of privity and negligence should
properly come from the legislature, the court simply stated that what
the courts have done, they can undo. As these concepts were of judicial
creation, they could also be judicially eliminated.2"'
In Capital Equipment Enterprises, Inc. v. North Pier Terminal
Co.,264 an action was brought by the buyer against the seller for breach
of express warranties as to the condition and quality of a used crane
and its lifting capacity. Judgment was rendered for the buyer in the
trial court, and the vendor appealed. The appellate court held that the
evidence supported a finding that: (1) a warranty had been made to
the buyer as to the condition of the crane; (2) the buyer had relied
upon the warranty in purchasing the crane; and (3) there was a breach
of warranty. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.
During the negotiations for the sale of the crane, the representation
had been made by the vendor that the crane "was in very good condi-
tion" and that it could lift thirty tons.
However, when the crane was tested, it failed to function entirely
and various parts of it were totally inoperable.
In its opinion, the court quoted the Uniform Commercial Code
26
as to express warranties. The court pointed out that in order to create
an express warranty, no formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee"
need be used by the vendor nor is a specific intention to make a war-
ranty necessary since an affirmation as to the quality of the chattel is
enough to create the warranty. However, whether an express warranty
has been made is basically a factual issue.2 6
260 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318 is quoted supra note 150.
261 Citing Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 407 Ill. 121, 94 N.E.2d 547 (1950).
262 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
263 Quoting Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 III 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959).
264 117 Ill. App. 2d 264, 254 N.E.2d 542 (1969).
265 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313; Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 313 (1969).
266 8 Wiliston, Contracts §§ 955-1011 (3d ed. Jaeger 1964).
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Although the vendor argued that the plaintiff did not rely upon
the warranty and that there had been a demonstration of the crane's
ability to operate, it appeared that a thorough examination of the crane
would require eight hours; no such inspection or examination was made
by the plaintiff. Consequently, an inspection "does not include reliance
upon an express warranty if the facts are not discovered by means of the
inspection." The evidence was held sufficient to support a finding that
plaintiff, in purchasing the crane, relied upon the warranty.
It is noteworthy that although the crane was a used machine, this
did not preclude the making of a warranty; it was so held in the instant
case.
26T
In Moore v. Jewel Tea Company,"' an action was brought by the
buyer against the manufacturer-distributor of a drain-cleaning product
when a can containing the drain cleaner exploded and serious injuries
were sustained by the buyer. After judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and her husband, the appellate court held that the jury could properly
conclude that there was an unreasonably dangerous element in this prod-
uct and accordingly affirmed the judgment below.
The facts indicated that the plaintiff's wife had purchased an 18-
ounce can of Drano from the Jewel Tea Company store in Chicago. The
next day, she took the can of Drano into the bathroom, put it down be-
side the sink and reached across to turn on the cold water faucet. Sud-
denly, she heard the sound of an explosion and experienced "a terrific
burning" in her eyes. The can of Drano had burst apart at the seams.
After an extensive discussion of the effect of the Statute of Limita-
tions upon the bill of complaint and the confusion existing between the
names "Drackett Company" and "Drackett Products Company" (the
manufacturers), the motion to dismiss was denied.
In its opinion, the court pointed out that the issue of strict liability
in Illinois is governed by Suvada v. White Motor Company269 and Dun-
ham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Manufacturing Co.. 270 The basic theory
of Suvada was that the plaintiff had to prove that the injury resulted
267 Capital Equipment Enterprises, Inc. v. North Pier Terminal Co., 117 InI. App. 2d
264, 254 N.E.2d 542 (1969).
268 116 IlL App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969).
269 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
270 42 IML 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
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from a condition of the product which was unreasonably dangerous and
which existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control.
In the Dunham case, the court stated that "the requirement that the de-
fect must have existed when the product left the manufacturer's control
does not mean that the defect must manifest itself at once." 27'
The concept of a defect, said the court, rests upon the premise that
"those products are defective which are dangerous because they fail to
perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of their nature
and intended function. 27 2
In the Dunham case, the plaintiff had used a hammer for eleven
months before it chipped and injured him. The judgment against the
manufacturer was affirmed because the jury could properly conclude
that, considering the length and type of its use, the hammer failed to
perform in the manner that would reasonably have been expected and
that this failure was responsible for the plaintiff's injury.
The court discussed at some length the theory of res ipsa loquitur.
The function of this theory, said the court, is to create the existence of
negligence from otherwise inexplicable facts.27
Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in a given case
is a question of law which must be decided in the first instance by the
trial court.2 4 However, the defect does not have to manifest itself im-
mediately; there may be a passage of time before it becomes apparent.
This applies to negligence as well as strict liability cases.
Citing Nichols v. Nold,275 the court pointed out that the plaintiff
had sued the bottler, a distributor and retailer of a bottle of Pepsi Cola
which had inexplicably exploded. Plaintiff therein testified that after
she had purchased the bottle, it had been handled carefully. The trial
court overruled the demurrers of the respective defendants and judg-
ment was entered for the plaintiff. Affirming, the Kansas Supreme Court
said:
The real test is whether the defendants were in control at the time
271 Id. at 342, 247 N.E.2d at 403.
272 Id.
278 Citing Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc., 42 III. 2d 345, 351, 247 N.E.2d 877, 880
(1969).
274 Id.
275 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953).
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of the negligent act or omission which either at that time or later
produced the accident.27
6
Nichols v. Nold is considered one of the leading precedents on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
On the subject of damages, the court observed, "[lt is well estab-
lished in Illinois that where there is evidence of willful, wanton con-
duct, punitive damages may be allowed. 277
"It is difficult," said the court, "if not impossible, to lay down a
short and simple governing rule on this subject.
278
In this case, the plaintiff's wife lost the sight of both her eyes and
she was awarded $900,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in
the form of punitive damages; the husband-plaintiff was awarded
$20,000 as compensatory damages. The judgment was affirmed in all
particulars by the appellate court, Moore v. Jewel Tea Company.
In the next case, Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co.,279 the ques-
tion of liability arose in connection with certain scaffolding which had
been supplied by a lumber company. The workman who was on the
scaffolding was injured when a plank broke and he fell. This resulted
in the indemnity suit by the plaintiff which had settled the claims of its
injured workmen. The lumber company, in turn, instituted a third party
complaint against another lumber company which had furnished the
wood for the scaffolding.
Judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs in the trial court and a
directed verdict entered for the third party plaintiff, whereupon the
lumber companies appealed. The appellate court affirmed, holding that
the theory of strict liability for a defective product applied to sellers
and suppliers of defective products and that accordingly, judgment was
properly rendered in favor of the plaintiffs on their indemnity claim
against defendant lumber company. Here, once again reliance was
placed upon Suvada v. White Motor Co."'
The defendant alleged that there was no authority under the Su-
vada theory for allowing indemnity against persons in the distributive
276 Id. at 620, 258 P.2d at 323.
277 Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 I1. App. 2d 109, 134, 253 N.E.2d 636, 648 (1969).
278 Id.
279 118 TI. App. 2d 65, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969).
280 32 I. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
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chain of defective products. The defendant concluded that no indemnity
could be given to the plaintiff since the law does not allow indemnity
among tortfeasors who have been equally negligent with regard to the
injured party.
However, this argument was rejected by the court and the doctrine
of strict liability was held to be applicable to suppliers of multipurpose
products which are placed in the stream of commerce with knowledge
of the product's intended use. Accordingly, it was held that the supreme
court in Suvada intended that the decision was to apply to sellers and
suppliers of defective products as well as the manufacturer who is in-
volved in that decision.2 ' The following was then quoted from Suvada
v. White Motor Company:. 2
Without extended discussion, it seems obvious that public interest
in human life and health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase
the product and the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating
the risk and reaping the profit are present and is compelling in cases
involving motor vehicles and other products, where the defective condi-
tion makes them unreasonably dangerous to the user, as they are in
food cases.288
This statement manifests a strong public policy that insists upon
the distribution of the economic burden in the most socially desirable
manner, even to the extent of ignoring the indemnitee's fault.2 4
Finally, as to the sufficiency of the evidence the court decided that
there was "substantial evidence" introduced which would allow the
jury to conclude upon the proof of causation.
In the case of Van Winkle v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,28 the
court held, in a breach of warranty action against the manufacturer
and vendor of a re-treaded tire which allegedly blew out and caused a
serious accident, that there had been no sufficient proof to establish a
defect. Accordingly, there was no basis for an action for breach of war-
ranty; the trial court, which had entered judgment for the plaintiff,
was reversed. The court cited Schramek v. General Motors Corp.,80
281 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966), the court cites Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A (1964) and Comments.
282 32 IMl. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
283 Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186; 8 Williston, Contracts §§ 955-1011 (3d ed. Jaeger
1964).
284 94 111. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968).
285 117 IM. App. 2d 324, 253 N.E.2d 588 (1969).
280 69 111. App. 2d 72, 216 N.E. 244 (1966).
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where recovery was sought for injuries resulting from the blowout of a
tire which caused an accident. There, the court had said,
The cornerstone of plaintiff's cause of action is the existence of a
defect in the tire at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or
seller. Without this proof his case must fall.
The mere fact of a tire blowout does not demonstrate the manu-
facturer's negligence, nor tend to establish that the tire was defective.
Blowouts can be attributed to myriad causes, including not only the
care with which the tires are maintained but the condition of the roads
over which they are driven and the happenstance striking of damaging
objects.
28 7
With reference to the case of Sweeney v. Matthew,88 the court said
that it did not control the Van Winkle case since in the Sweeney case a
nail had broken off and lodged in the eye of the carpenter who was
driving the nail into the wood. Evidence of metal tests made on other
nails in the same sack was admitted to show a defect in the metal causing
brittleness which in turn caused the accident.
However, in Van Winkle there was nothing to show that the blow-
out of the tire in question was caused by any neglect, negligence or any
defect of the tire when it left the manufacturer. Accordingly, it was
held that the record did not support the judgment in favor of plaintiff
and it was therefore reversed.
In Endurance Paving Co. v. Pappas,2 s9 an action was brought by
a contractor to recover a balance due on a paving contract and a counter
claim was filed by the owners for damages. The trial court rendered
judgment for the contractor and the owners appealed.
The contention of the defendant was that the paving which the
contractor was to do on a parking lot had not been done in accordance
with the specifications and had not been accomplished in a "workman-
like manner." In the course of the trial court's instructions, it gave one
(numbered 4) which reads as follows:
The Court instructs the jury that if you fail to find from the evi-
dence that any defects in the parking lots of the Defendant-Counter-
plaintiffs were caused by the Plaintiff-Counterdefendant and that the
work of the Plaintiff-Counterdefendant was not done in accordance
287 Van Winkle v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 117 IlM. App. 2d 324, 253 N.E.2d 588,
591 (1969).
288 94 Il1. App. 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968).
289 117 Ill. App. 2d 81, 253 N.E.2d 895 (1969).
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with the specifications then the jury will find for the Plaintiff-Counter-
defendant and against the Defendant-Counterplaintiffs' on the De-
fendants-Counterplaintiffs' Counter claim.
290
This failed to take into account the further requirement that the
job had to be done in "a workmanlike manner. 291 Consequently, this
instruction failed to state the law accurately and thereupon, the appel-
late court reversed and remanded.
In Blade v. Sloan,292 an action was brought by the sellers to re-
cover the amount bid at an auction sale for a used combine. It had been
stated that the combine was in good condition, but it turned out that it
was unfit for the use intended, namely, to combine corn. The Uniform
Commercial Code was referred to since this was an express warranty; 298
also, no specific word such as "warrant" need be used in order to create
an express warranty. Although this was a used machine, it was never-
theless held that an express warranty had been made. Specifically,
there was a crack in the engine block which caused the combine to break
down. However, judgment was given for the plaintiffs for the amount
of the sale price of the combine because the warranty was only effective
at the time of delivery and when the combine thereafter failed it was
no longer covered by the warranty.294
Other Current Cases
In Lopez v. Brackett Stripping Machine Co.,"5 an action was
brought against a manufacturer of a machine in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois for injuries sustained
by the plaintiff while attempting to clean the machine. It was shown
that the book-trimming machine had not worked properly and accord-
ingly there was a motion to dismiss the indemnity action which the
manufacturer had filed against the plaintiff's employer. Because of the
malfunctioning of the machine, the manufacturer could not obtain in-
290 Id. at 86-87, 253 N.E.2d at 897-98.
291 Discussed further in Part II of this article, 47 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1 (1970).
292 108 111. App. 2d 7, 248 N.E.2d 142 (1969). Cl. Capital Equipment Enterprises,
Inc., v. North Pier Terminal Co., supra note 267.
293 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313.
294 This would appear to be a failure of the proof necessary to establish a breach at the
time of delivery.
295 303 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Illinois 1969).
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demnity from the plaintiff's employer under Illinois law on the theory
that efctive negligence could only be attributed to the employer.29
When a motor boat engine exploded, the buyer brought this action
alleging breach of the warranty of fitness for use, McKee v. Bruns-
wick Corporation.297 The federal court, applying Illinois law, held that
the evidence did not compel the inference that the boat was purchased
under its trade name or that the purchaser did not rely upon the seller in
selecting the boat. Also, it did not compel the inference that the ignition
coil, which caused the explosion, was not defective, or not in the boat,
when the sale occurred.
In a negligence and breach of warranty action against a designer
and assembler of a fire truck aerial ladder and the seller who had in-
stalled the ladder on the truck, recovery was barred by evidence that
the plaintiff climbed the ladder knowing that fly locks, intended to lock
the ladder in place as a safety measure and a stability feature, were
disengaged. Such evidence established as matter of law that the injuries
resulted from the misuse of the equipment, or contributory negligence,
rather than from any fault of the defendants, Neusus v. Sponholtz."'
In Pitts v. Basile,299 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the
distributor of a dart game was not liable for an injury to the playmate
of an eight-year old purchaser from a retailer; darts were not dangerous
instrumentalities. It was not negligence to fail to warn that the darts
should not be used by children or thrown in the direction of another
person; assuming that the packing and arrangement of darts were de-
signed to induce the purchase of the darts by children who would not
appreciate the risk involved, any negligence in this respect was not the
proximate cause of injury.
Causes of action in strict liability in tort and in negligence were
stated by a complaint, in an action for injury when the plaintiff's hand
was caught in the rollers of a 1953 Massey-Harris corn picker, manu-
factured by defendant, alleging that the defendant negligently designed
and manufactured the corn picker so that it was dangerously defective
296 Lopez v. Brackett Stripping Machine Co., 303 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Illinois 1969).
29T 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965).
298 369 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1966).
299 35 Ill. 2d 49, 219 N.E.2d 472 (1966), rev'g 55 111. App. 2d 37, 204 N.E.2d 43 (1965).
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and unfit for the purpose for which it was intended, Wright v. Massey-
Harris.80°
The manufacturer had a duty to warn of latent limitations of even
a perfectly made Allis Chalmers WD-45L-P tractor if use of the trac-
tor might be dangerous if the user was ignorant of its limitations and the
manufacturer had no reason to believe he would recognize the danger,
Biller v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.3 ' The Court held a cause of action
was stated against a manufacturer for injury to an employee of the pur-
chaser of a farm tractor caused by escape of propane gas from the trac-
tor's fuel tank, lack of privity was held no bar to recovery.
In an action against the manufacturer of a punch press for per-
sonal injury when the press, used to stamp television frames, struck
plaintiffs arms as he was endeavoring to remove the frame from the
press, the evidence supported a finding that the press had been delivered
by defendant with a selector switch which was negligently wired so as to
eliminate safety features otherwise present, and that such negligence
proximately caused the injury. Recovery was not barred by the fact that
the press was used, without incident, for some five years prior to the
accident, Mitchell v. Four States Machinery Co.8"2
Complaint in an action by a hotel against air conditioner manu-
facturer to recover for property damage and loss of rent due to malfunc-
tion of machinery held to state cause of action for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability and for negligent design, construction and
manufacture of units; lack of privity did not bar recovery for negli-
gence, Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc. 03
In an action against a rope manufacturer for injury to the plain-
tiff when the rope, being used to move a wooden beam in a building under
construction, broke, the trial court erred in granting judgment for the
defendant notwithstanding a verdict for the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
entitled to the benefit of res ipsa loquitur, notwithstanding that the rope
was not in defendant's physical control at the time of the accident, where
plaintiff's evidence was that the rope was new and broke while holding
less than 1/25th of its rated capacity; but the defendant was entitled to
800 68 IIl. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
301 34 11. App. 2d 47, 180 N.E.2d 46 (1962).
802 74 Ill. App. 2d 59, 220 N.E.2d 109 (1966).
803 68 ILl. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1966).
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a new trial where the question whether the rope was new was disputed,
May v. Columbian Rope Co."°4
In an action for injury from the presence of a mouse in Coca-Cola
allegedly bottled by defendant, defendant could not complain of in-
struction because of lack of proof that the Coca-Cola bottle from which
the plaintiff drank was defendant's product where the defendant's prof-
fered instruction impliedly told the jury that the bottle of Coca-Cola
was its product, Harris v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.808
In Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., it was held that
the strict liability doctrine did not permit recovery by a cosmetic manu-
facturer against manufacturer of can from which cosmetic leaked, with
resulting commercial loss to the plaintiff; but, notwithstanding lack of
privity, the plaintiff could recover on an implied warranty of fitness,
the manufacturer having been aware of purpose to which the product
was to be put and having known of plaintiff's reliance that the product
would be fit for the purpose intended, reversing judgment denying re-
covery."' °
The manufacturer of "Lanolin Discovery," was not liable, on the
ground of negligence, for an injury allegedly caused by ignition of the
product notwithstanding failure to warn of flammability, where there
was no evidence that the manufacturer knew or should have known of
the danger; the question of manufacturer's liability on ground of breach
of implied warranty of fitness was for jury, Hardman v. Helene Curtis
Industries, Inc.07
304 40 Ill. App. 2d 264, 189 N.E.2d 394 (1963).
The manufacturer of construction hoists was not held liable, on the grounds of neg-
ligence or breach of warranty of fitness, for injuries and death caused by the fall of the
hoist, where the hoist was not intended to carry personnel, Nelson v. Union Wire Rope
Corp., 39 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963) applying Florida law; also holding the
manufacturer of cable used on the hoist, not liable for negligence or breach of warranty.
The trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendant in a personal injury action
against the manufacturer of an automobile jack from which a Cadillac slipped and fell
on the plaintiff, where there was evidence that the plaintiff knew that the jack was un-
suitable for use on a Cadillac and that his own lack of care in dealing with the known
condition proximately caused the accident, Brandenburg v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 77 Il. App.
2d. 374, 222 N.E.2d 348 (1967).
305 35 Ill. App. 2d 406, 183 N.E.2d 56 (1962).
306 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966).
307 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964).
The manufacturer of "Ryoles" wall plastering material was not held liable, for the
failure of the plaster, to plaintiff, with whom he was not in privity, where the failure was
not caused by inherent defect in the plaster but by the contractor's failure to follow the
manufacturer's instructions, Dittmar v. Ahern, 37 Ill. App. 2d 167, 185 N.E.2d 264 (1962).
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Does Warranty Apply to the Professions?
In the final case to be discussed in this section, a decision handed
down by the supreme court, it was held that a warranty may apply to
transactions other than sales of goods or, more recently, houses. 8' In
this instance, a survey of a building lot was made and based thereon,
a house was built. It turned out later that a mistake had been made in
consequence of which the house and garage were erected in such a
manner that each encroached upon a neighboring lot. Cost of moving
and "rehabilitating both" was $13,030.
In the trial court, judgment was for the plaintiff, but the inter-
mediate appellate court reversed, 0 9 and granted leave to appeal. Plain-
tiffs predicated their case on certain specified theories including:
1. Strict liability in tort; 10
2. Implied warranty "free of the privity requirement";...
3. The third-party beneficiary doctrine;.1
4. Express warranty "free of the privity requirement;"3 and
5. Tortious misrepresentation.314
The supreme court, after summarizing the facts, referred to the
leading precedent, Suvada v. White Motor Co., 15 and pointed out that
strict liability in tort was imposed on "sellers of products in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 31
However, the court emphasized that there was nothing to indicate
in what manner "this survey could be found to be an unreasonably
dangerous product within the language or rationale of section 402A."' "
308 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 fI. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
309 Rozny v. Marnul, 83 Ill. App. 2d 110, 227 N.E.2d 156 (1966).
310 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 (1965).
311 8 Williston, Contracts §§ 982 et seq. (3d ed. Jaeger 1964).
312 2 Williston, Contracts §§ 347-403 (3d. Jaeger 1959).
313 8 Williston, Contracts §§ 970 et seq. (3d ed. Jaeger 1964).
314 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) ; Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966) ; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168
Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) ; Prosser, Misrepresentations and Third Persons, 19 Vand. L.
Rev. 231 (1966) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B (1965).
315 32 IlI. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) af'g 51 IM. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313
(1964).
816 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 111. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
317 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1964), quoted note 259 supra.
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There was no need to determine what warranties the law might imply
since the essential basis of the plaintiffs' claim was the "express repre-
sentation of accuracy made by the defendant" who was a registered
Illinois land surveyor.818
Adverting to the plaintiffs' theory of third-party beneficiary re-
covery on the "express written warranty contract" between the builder
and defendant surveyor, the court observed,
[i]t is clear that the contract was not made for the direct benefit of the
plaintiffs as "direct benefit" has been traditionally interpreted in con-
nection with third-party beneficiary actions.8 19 Although we are aware
of cases 20 which evidence the increasing disregard for the privity
requirement through continued expansion of the class of permissible
plaintiffs under the third-party beneficiary doctrine, and realize that in
factual situations similar to the instant case recovery has been granted
under this theory,321 we believe the fundamental reasoning underlying
the tortious misrepresentation theory more nearly accommodates this
case than the expanded third-party beneficiary doctrine.822
The court recognized the existence of many product liability cases
which have granted recovery to third parties on the theory of express
warranty to the consumer. 23 However, if the term "warranty" is used
in this connection, it must be understood that a different kind of war-
ranty is meant than when the warranty is made between the "immediate
contracting parties." '324 The privity requirement (?) alleged to be nec-
essary in the latter case has been largely discarded in the former.
8 25
After discussing the elimination of privity in connection with tort war-
ranty, the court added:
818 Printed on the survey plat was the following statement:
IMPORTANT
Before starting any excavating or building, excavators and builders are re-
quested to compare all measurements and should any discrepancies be found, report
same to our home office at once.
This plat of survey carries our absolute guarantee for accuracy, and is issued
subject to faithful carrying out of the above and foregoing instructions and condi-
tions before any liability will be assumed on part of the Jens K. Doe Survey Service.
Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 58-59, 250 N.E.2d 656, 658-59 (1969).
319 Citing Cherry v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 372 Il. 534, 25 N.E.2d 11 (1939);
Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 346 Ill. 252, 178 N.E. 498 (1931).
820 Citing Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d
726 (1966) ; 50 New Walden, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 39 Misc. 2d 460, 241 N.Y.S.2d 128
(1963).
821 Citing e.g., Vandewater & Lapp v. Sacks Builders, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 677, 186 N.Y.S.2d
103 (1959).
822 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
823 These cases are discussed in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has The Tocsin Sounded?,
1 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 1 (1963).
824 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, Comment (c); § 402B, Comment (e)
(1964).
825 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 CaL 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
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This process of adhering to or eliminating the privity requirement
has proved to be an unsatisfactory method of establishing the scope of
tort liability to third persons. Because of the difficulties in applying the
rule, courts created exceptions deemed necessary to achieve desirable
results which were not always completely reconcilable. 26 To eliminate
any uncertainty still remaining after Suvada v. White Motor Com-
pany,8 27 we emphasize that lack of direct contractual relationship be-
tween the parties is not a defense in a tort action in this jurisdiction.
Thus, tort liability will henceforth be measured by the scope of the duty
owed rather than the artificial concepts of privity.
Having discarded any remnants of the privity concept, we now
concern ourselves with the scope of defendant's liability using tradi-
tional tortious misrepresentation standards.3 28
Charting the development of the concept that "performance of a
private contract can give rise to duties in tort," the court cited Thomas
v. Winchester329 as the first case to have departed from the privity re-
quirement following its articulation in Winterbottom v. Wright.80
Where physical injuries resulted from the use of the defective product,
recovery was allowed regardless of privity; the landmark case was, of
course, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."3'
While at first, there had to be a palpable physical injury, an ex-
tension to intangible economic interests soon resulted, Glanzer v.
Shepard.3 ' In that case, liability was predicated upon the fact that
"the public weigher of beans at a seller's request was liable to the buyer
damaged by negligent overstatement of the weight because the weigher
knew the buyer would rely on the erroneous weight statement."38
Subsequently, however, the same court in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co.334 declined to hold an auditing firm liable when
it negligently certified an inaccurate audit although it was used as a
basis for the loan of money "to an actually insolvent firm." The dis-
tinction between the two cases was alleged to be that the statement of
weight in Glanzer was "primarily" for the use of the purchaser while
326 Citing Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W.2d 873 (1958).
327 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 IlM. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1964).
328 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
329 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
330 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
331 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
332 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
333 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Il1. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
84 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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the audit statement in Ultramares was only "incidentally" for the use
of third parties. 8 5
While the courts were not adverse to imposing liability when the
reliance of third persons was known,88 there was a distinct disinclination
where such reliance was merely "foreseeable." '387 After an extensive
discussion of various theories of liability, 8' the court examined two
significant but conflicting decisions: M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra
Costa Sanitary District,"3 9 and Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chat-
tanooga.4' In the former, the California court held an engineering
company liable for the negligent preparation of a soil report where it
was known that it would be used in the preparation of a bid for work
on a sewer system.
In the Texas Tunneling case, however, a federal circuit court of
appeals, on similar facts, held that there was no liability although the
trial court had given judgment for the plaintiff. 41 But it should be
pointed out that the federal appellate court's decision was rendered
prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Ford Motor
Co. v. Lonon 42 which expanded the scope of recovery for misrepresen-
tation in that State. Also, the report under consideration in Texas
Tunneling expressly disclaimed responsibility for any inaccuracies.
4
The court then cited a much more recent case, Rusch Factors, Inc.
v. LevinW " which was decided in accordance with the Miller case. This,
too, was an accountancy case similar to the New York decision in Ultra.
mares. The basis for liability was that reliance by third parties was
foreseeable by the negligent accountant. Another federal district court
3 The facts of these two cases, Glanzer and Ultramares, seem to make it clear that a
more persuasive factor was that in Ultramares there was potential "liability in an indeter-
minate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
836 Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899).
837 National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, 143 N.E. 833 (1924).
838 And an examination of "an excellent article by Dean Prosser, Misrepresentation and
Third Persons," 19 Vand. L. Rev. 231 (1966).
839 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961).
840 329 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1962).
841 Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
842 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
848 In the case under consideration, Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656
(1969), as the court pointed out, there was an express "absolute guarantee for accuracy";
see note 318.
$44 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.L 1968).
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in Fischer v. Kletz,845 applying New York law, held the defendant
liable for a failure to disclose after-acquired information which in-
validated the accuracy of facts which had previously been certified as
accurate.
As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, the factors we con-
sider relevant to our holding are:
(1) The express, unrestricted and wholly voluntary "absolute
guarantee for accuracy" appearing on the face of the inaccurate plat;
(2) Defendant's knowledge that this plat would be used and
relied on by others than the person ordering it, including plaintiffs;
(3) The fact that potential liability in this case is restricted to a
comparatively small group, and that, ordinarily, only one member of
that group will suffer loss;
(4) The absence of proof that copies of the corrected plat were
delivered to anyone;
(5) The undesirability of requiring an innocent reliant party to
carry the burden of a surveyor's professional mistakes;
(6) That recovery here by a reliant user whose ultimate use was
foreseeable will promote cautionary techniques among surveyors.
3 48
Basing its decision upon the aforequoted considerations, the court
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment,3 47 and added:
To the extent that this holding may be thought contrary to prior
decisional law of this State, particularly National Iron and Steel Co.
v. Hunt,3 48 and Albin T. Illinois v. Crop Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 849
such decisions are no longer the law.350
Although this determination disposed of the question of liability,
two issues remained unresolved: (1) the applicable Statute of Limita-
tions, and (2) the allegedly excessive damages. The court rejected the
defendant's contention that the Statute of Limitations was one govern-
ing actions ex contractu, and held that "all civil actions not otherwise
provided for, shall be commenced within 5 years next after the cause
of action accrued." '51 This, said the court, "encompasses actions for
tortious misrepresentations; thus, the limitation period is 5 years." '852
345 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
846 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 III. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
847 Citations omitted.
348 312 Il. 245, 143 N.E. 833 (1924).
349 30 Ill. App. 2d, 174 N.E.2d 697 (1961).
850 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 68, 250 N.E. 656, 663 (1969).
851 Quoting § 15 of the Limitations Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 16 (1961).
352 Citing Keithley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 271 111. 584, 111 N.E. 503 (1916) ; Bates v.
Bates Machine Co., 230 Ill. 619, 82 N.E. 911 (1907).
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The more difficult question presented by the appeal was when "the
cause of action accrued." The plaintiffs had purchased the property
early in 1956, but did not become aware of the encroachment of the
house and garage upon the neighboring lot until 1962. The defendant
argued that the statute began to run when the survey plat was delivered





The plaintiff urged that the "discovery rule" should be adopted,
pointing out that this had not been passed on but that "policy con-
siderations" should dictate acceptance of this rule; said the court:
The basic problem is one of balancing the increase in difficulty of
proof which accompanies the passage of time against the hardship to
the plaintiff who neither knows nor should have known of the existence
of his right to sue. There are some actions in which the passage of time,
from the instant when the facts giving rise to liability occurred, so
greatly increases the problems of proof that it has been deemed neces-
sary to bar plaintiffs who had not become aware of their rights of
action within the statutory period as measured from the time such facts
occurred.3 54 But where the passage of time does little to increase the
problems of proof, the ends of justice are served by permitting plaintiff
to sue within the statutory period computed from the time at which
he knew or should have known of the existence of the right to sue.3 55
Currently, this area of the law is receiving considerable attention as a
great majority of the courts adopt a discovery ("known or should have
known") rule as to the time at which a cause of action for medical mal-
practice accrues, particularly where the negligence charged involves
leaving foreign objects within the patient at the conclusion of an opera-
tion,356 although some courts have not limited this development to
foreign object cases. 5 7
After a review of the decision in New Market Poultry Farm v.
353 See note 318 where the terms of the "guarantee" are quoted.
354 Citing Skinner v. Anderson, 38 I. 2d 455, 458, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) ; New Mar-
ket Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (1968).
855 Citing Wanless v. Peabody Coal Co., 294 Ill. App. 401, 13 N.E.2d 996 (1938) ; cf.
Eichelberger v. Homerding, 317 Ill. App. 125, 45 N.E.2d 493 (1942).
356 Citing Flanagan v. Mt. Eden General Hospital, 24 N.Y.2d 427, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 248
N.E. 871; Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968) ; Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.
1967) ; Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
357 Citing Frohs v. Greene, 88 Or. 131, 452 P.2d 564 (1969) ; Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital,
433 P.2d 220, 223 (Hawaii 1967) ; Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1965). Here, the
court added:
Illinois has been involved in this development. In 1964, an Illinois appellate court
(Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital, 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633) felt com-
pelled to hold that the statute commenced to run at the date of the wrong and not
from the date of discovery. The legislature responded by enacting section 21.1 of
the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 83 par. 22.1) providing for a discovery
rule as to accrual of foreign object medical malpractice actions. Rozny v. Marnul,
43 1l. 2d 54, 71, 250 N.E.2d 656, 665 (1969).
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Fellows,58 the supreme court concluded that the state legislature had
clearly indicated its intent that the Statute of Limitations should run
from the time when "the person claiming such damages actually knows
or should have known of such negligence, errors or omissions [of
surveyors] .""
"We accordingly hold," said the court, "in keeping with the more
recent authorities and the legislative policy manifested by our Gen-
eral Assembly, that the statute of limitations does not bar plaintiffs'
,,860
recovery ....
As to the plaintiffs' failure to mitigate damages, which had not
been presented before, it was abundantly clear "that defendant may not
now complain that plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages." ''
In sum, the cases which have been reviewed indicate certain trends
when defective products or services are manufactured, sold or tendered
which result in physical injury or property damage:
858 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (1968) ; in this case the Supreme Court of New Jersey
had to determine the date when the limitation period commenced to run on an error in a
plat made in 1952 but not discovered to be inaccurate until 1963. The court recognized that
in almost identical circumstances courts of that jurisdiction had held the statute ran from
the date of the breach of duty. (241 A.2d at 635.) However, after analyzing the problem in
light of the purpose of Statutes of Limitations ably stated in an earlier opinion (Fernandi v.
Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277, which established a discovery rule in foreign object med-
ical malpractice cases) that court stated:
Here as in Fernandi, * * * the credibility of plaintiff's claim is not questioned and
the incontestable factual pattern presented to us on this motion bespeaks the prob-
ability of defendant's negligent fault in the acreage calculation. The passage of time
does not entail the danger of a fraudulent, false, frivolous, speculative or uncertain
claim. Nor is such danger even suggested by defendants. Further, under the said
facts it does not appear possible that by reason of the passage of time defendant's
testimonial proof of a defense would be made more difficult. The circumstances so
portrayed do not permit a suggestion that Mrs. Pack knowingly slept on her right
but to the contrary establish that she brought suit expeditiously after she discovered
her alleged actual damage. Accordingly we hold that under the facts and circum-
stances as presented, the motion for summary judgment should have been denied.
Such a result, as noted, is consistent with Fernandi and in harmony with the trend
in other jurisdictions. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 421-22, 241 A.2d at 636-37.
859 Quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, par. 24g (1967).
860 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 72-3, 250 N.E.2d 656, 665-66 (1969), referring to
New Market Poultry Farms v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (1968) and Fernandi v.
Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
361 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 IMI 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
As this article goes to press, the opinion of the federal court for the Southern District
of Illinois in Little v. Maxam, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. 111. 1970), has just been
published. Summary judgment was denied in an action by an employee who was injured
while using a machine bought by her employer. The court quoted the opinion in Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 ll. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), as to the public policy of Illinois,
and its extension by Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Manufacturing Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339,
247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
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1. Privity of warranty is being discarded at a growing rate;
2. Liability is being extended to include "innocent bystanders"
who are injured by the product; and
3. Recovery is gradually being allowed when there is no physical
injury but only property damage.*
* Editor's Note: In the second and final part of his article, Dr. Jaeger describes the
warranty of habitability and reviews its current status in the courts.
